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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of a new and pressing environmental problem is 
usually followed by a chorus of calls for new legislation.  Such laws 
may take years to develop, are watered down by business lobbyists, 
and are susceptible to the shifting political winds of Washington.  
Even after their enactment, the effectiveness of these laws is undercut 
as polluters find loopholes through which to avoid accountability.  
Superfund is one example.1 
While the passing of new legislation serves the important func-
tion of codifying society’s stance on the environment, common law 
remedies are immediately available to the states to address environ-
mental problems.  This is too often overlooked in the “new prob-
 
 1. See Allan Kanner, Toxic Tort Litigation in a Regulatory World, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 535 
(2002); Allan Kanner, Rethinking Superfund, 20 NAT’L ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’LS NEWS 19 (1995). 
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lems—new laws” paradigm, and thus common law remedies should 
be resurrected to further the policy goals of environmental enforce-
ment.  A state’s Attorney General (“AG”) may bring actions to re-
dress environmental harm under both the public trust2 and parens pa-
triae doctrines.3 
Under the public trust doctrine, state AGs can sue, as trustee, for 
damages to natural resources that are held in the public trust.4  To re-
cover damages, the AG must demonstrate that the public trust has 
been violated by an “unreasonable interference with the use and en-
joyment of trust rights.”5  Some states allow for the recovery of natu-
ral resource damages (“NRD”) to any natural resource,6 while others 
only allow for the recovery of damages to natural resources that the 
state government actually owns.7  States vary as to what is encom-
passed by the public trust. 
AGs can also bring parens patriae suits to recover for damages to 
a state’s natural resources.  Parens patriae (“parent of the country”) 
allows a state government to sue to redress injury to a state’s sover-
eign and quasi-sovereign interests, including the environment.8 
Policy arguments support the AG’s use of public trust and parens 
patriae actions to recover for damages to natural resources.  This liti-
gation strategy should have broad based appeal across political ide-
ologies because the notion that a responsible party should pay for the 
damage it causes is neither a liberal nor a conservative idea.  Fur-
thermore, litigation by the state AG, when used in conjunction with a 
contingency fee arrangement with private litigators,9 requires little re-
sources or regulatory schemes by the state.  This cost-shifting incen-
tive is especially beneficial to states, many of whom are currently ex-
 
 2. See infra  Part III. 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 176 (1977 & Supp. 
1984) (stating that the public trust doctrine can be invoked offensively by the government to 
collect damages to trust property). 
 5. Id. at 175. 
 6. EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 
52-53 (2001). 
 7. See id. at 53 (citing State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Agway Inc., 232 A.2d 69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)).  In both cases, state claims for the 
loss of fish failed because of the state’s lack of property interest in the fish. 
 8. Carter H. Strickland Jr., The Scope of Authority of Natural Resource Trustees, 20 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 318 (1995). 
 9. See generally Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, The Use of Contingent Fees in Natural Re-
source Damage and Other Parens Patriae Cases, 19 BNA TOXICS L. REP. 745 (2004).  
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periencing deep budget cuts.10  Also, AGs can pick and choose which 
cases and industries to target, so that environmental policy can be 
balanced against other policy considerations of the state. 
II.  SUPERFUND’S SHORTCOMINGS 
Superfund,11 despite its noble intent to make polluters pay to 
cleanup hazardous wastes, has been a failure.12  It has achieved very 
little actual cleanup, while producing an archive of studies and risk as-
sessments.13  Businesses have been excessively drawn into litigation 
and ordered to carry out frivolous and unproductive measures.14  The 
environment and the public have not received adequate cleanups, the 
original goal of Superfund.15  Ironically, but not surprisingly, the only 
study commissioned by the Superfund Congress concerned toxic tort 
claims, and the resulting study concluded that federal legislation was 
not needed.16 
One problem is that Superfund long ago abandoned the simple 
idea of cleanup in favor of the development of complex remediation 
plans.17  Superfund morphed into a risk management statute that at-
tempted to manage waste instead of simply cleaning it up.  Polluters, 
who were given extraordinary power under Superfund to investigate 
their pollution, have focused on risk management remedies instead of 
returning polluted land to its prepollution state.18  Such risk assess-
 
 10. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE FISCAL 
CONDITIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES ON STATE BUDGETS 1 (2004), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/10-22-03sfp4.pdf. 
 11. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., Kanner, Rethinking Superfund, supra note 1, at 19. 
 13. Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 170 (1993) (“Much of the Superfund budget is being con-
sumed by repetitive feasibility studies, administrative costs, and litig ation rather than actual 
cleanup expenditures. ”). 
 14. See id. at 172-75.  The joint and several liability approach to Superfund cases has led to 
an explosion in litigation in which the EPA has pursued big companies with deep pockets while 
ignoring the less wealthy waste generators, who are often the most culpable for the problems. 
 15. Id. at 175. 
 16. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENVTL. & PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG. REPORT ON CERCLA 
LEGAL REMEDIES 1, (Comm. Print 1982).  An exception was made to liberalize state discovery 
rules which determine the trigger for running of statute of limitations.  See Allan Kanner & 
Eunice Trevor, Federal Expansion of the State Statute of Limitations in Hazardous Materials 
Cases, 29 THE BARRISTER 34 (1988). 
 17. See McGee, supra note 13, at 168-70. 
 18. Michael Weisskopf, Administrative Costs Drain ‘Superfund;’ Few Toxic Waste Sites Ac-
tually Cleaned Up, WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at A1. 
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ment “remedies” include capping the waste at levels polluters desire 
or determining that doing nothing is less risky than attempting a 
cleanup.19 
Superfund also has a poor response time.  In some cases, there is 
a seven-year gap between a site being listed on the National Priorities 
List (“NPL”) and the beginning of any remediation.20  Polluters are 
able to delay the process through the use of feasibility studies.  It is 
not uncommon for three or four feasibility studies to be undertaken 
before a cleanup starts.21 
The poor response time and bureaucratic nature has resulted in a 
bad track record for Superfund.  In its first seven years, less than 
twenty NPL sites were cleaned up.22  By 1991, only sixty-four sites had 
been cleaned up.23  Clearly, in the interests of environmental protec-
tion and compensation, a new approach with ancient roots should be 
tried by the states. 
III.  THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction 
The public trust doctrine refers to the duty of sovereign states to 
hold and preserve certain resources, including wildlife, for the benefit 
of its citizens.24  Described simply, the doctrine provides that natural 
resources belong to the whole public; private owners may not deprive 
the public of access.  The state has legal authority to pursue causes of 
action for damages and injunctive relief against parties responsible 
for the pollution of natural resources.25  If properly used, especially by 
the state AG, complete relief for the state citizenry is often possible.26  
 
 19. It can be said that site remediation was nevertheless costly to the responsible busi-
nesses.  For the most part, nothing has been spent on natural resource damages. 
 20. See McGee, supra  note 13, at 169. 
 21. See James Bovard, The Real Superfund Scandal, 89 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 13 
(1987). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Weisskopf, supra note 18. 
 24. See, e.g ., Darren K. Cottriel, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the 
Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1261 (1996). 
 25. There might be an exception relating to some transaction costs, such as the costs of suit. 
 26. Distinctly, and beyond the scope of this paper, a state may also bring an action in its 
proprietary capacity to recover damages to its property.  See, e.g ., Submerged Lands Act of 
1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2000) (granting title to the state to all lands lying beneath naviga-
ble waters within three miles of the coastline).  See Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 
401 U.S. 325 (1973) (regarding state legislation of water pollution).  
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The state’s right to this relief is rooted in the common law’s public 
trust doctrine, which provides that public lands, waters, and other re-
sources are held in trust by the government for the benefit of its citi-
zens.27 
Historically, the purpose of the public trust doctrine was to pro-
tect water resources for navigation and commerce when waterways 
were the principal means of transportation and a source of food.28  
Thus, the doctrine originally evolved to allow recovery by the State in 
cases involving discharges into navigable waterways and tidelands.29 
B. History 
The theory of the public trust is an ancient legal doctrine.30  It 
evolved from Roman law into English common law, and was passed 
on to the American colonies.  From there, the doctrine has evolved 
through a series of court decisions.  In the early United States, it pro-
tected beaches and navigable waterways so that commerce could pro-
ceed unimpeded.31  In the last fifty years, however, both the scope and 
the purpose of the public trust doctrine have changed. 
1. Roman Law 
The idea of the public trust dates back to early Roman law32 or 
even earlier.33  The public’s interest in and right to certain communi-
 
 27. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (“The pub-
lic’s right to use the tidal lands and waters encompasses navigation, fishing, and recreational 
uses, including bathing, swimming, and other shore activities.”); Borough of Neptune City v. 
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (N.J. 
1821); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978).  Many bodies of water are 
thus deemed quasi-public property, giving the sovereign special prerogatives at the expense of 
private parties.  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (certain lands are held by the 
state in trust for the people, and legislative actions are void or voidable if the court finds they 
violate the trust); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (public trust extends 
to all tidal waters, not just navigable waters). 
 28. Mary Kyle McCurdy, Public Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683, 683-84 
(1989). 
 29. As a practical matter, public trust is akin to standing, and a separate claim for public 
nuisance, trespass, strict liability, or unjust enrichment must be proven. 
 30. See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust 
Doctrine in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 31-35 (2000) (describing the public trust 
doctrine as having roots in early Roman civil law). 
 31. DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY 
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 224 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 631, 636 (1986). 
 32. Lazarus, supra note 31, at 633. 
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tarian goods and benefits went unquestioned.34  As stated by Justin-
ian: 
[T]he following things are by natural law common to all—the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the sea-shore.  No one 
therefore is forbidden access to the sea-shore . . . for these are not, 
like the sea itself, subject to the law of nations. . . . Again, the public 
use of the banks of a river, as of the river itself, is part of the law of 
nations; consequently every one is entitled to bring his vessel to the 
bank, and fasten cables to the trees growing there, and use it as a 
resting-place for the cargo, as freely as he may navigate the river it-
self. . . . But they cannot be said to belong to any one as private 
property, but rather are subject to the same law as the sea itself, 
with the soil or sand which lies beneath it.35 
Stated in other words, private property rights do not necessarily en-
compass the entire material world, and much of that nonprivate world 
is a valuable adjunct to the world of private property. 
In addition to public goods, the Romans also recognized the an-
cient right of the sovereign to take private property for public use, or 
eminent domain.36  The Romans also prov ided for land use controls, 
such as housing and construction restrictions.37  Later, as more mod-
ern notions of property emerged, these goods and advantages became 
the property of the state held for the benefit of all.38  Finally, the 
rights-based notion grew to encompass various public responsibili-
ties.39 
 
 33. See Horner, supra  note 30, at 31 (noting that some commentators believe that the pub-
lic trust doctrine may have roots in ancient Greece).  
 34. See J. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the Peo-
ple’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196-98 (1980). 
 35. J. INST. 35 § 2.1.1 (J. B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913). 
 36. In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution imposes an obligation 
on the national government to exercise due process of law in taking private property, as well as 
an obligation to pay for it: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 37. Jonathan P. Whalen, The Qualitative vs. Quantitative Approach to Nonconforming Uses 
Under Section 52-61 of the New York City Zoning Resolution: The Toys Case, 62 ALB. L. REV. 
323, 323 (1998).  
 38. See Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 241-42 (2001) (“If 
a thing were set aside for public use by public functionaries or political community, it was cate-
gorized as res publicae. Public buildings and the furniture within them are examples of this cate-
gory of property.”). 
 39. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property , 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774 (1986) (“The ‘public’ in question was the ‘public at 
large;’ sometimes it acted through organized governments, but it was also capable of acting 
through the medium of the customs and habits of a civilized citizenry.”). 
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2. Early English Law 
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, English villages were 
largely feudal and had “common” land for grazing livestock.40  The 
modern day conception of the common as a public right does not ac-
curately describe the medieval commons.  In the medieval commons 
system, either by a common law right as a freehold tenant or through 
usage and grants, a villager was entitled to pasture limited numbers of 
specific animals on the land not otherwise used by the feudal lord.41  
The villager also had the right to cut wood, to fish, and to cut peat or 
turf for fuel.42  Even from the beginning, the use of the commons was 
regulated: The villages determined the type and number of animals 
permitted in the commons, the time of year they could be loose, how 
long they might graze, and when they must be removed.43 
In addition, the English allowed the king to declare lands to be 
“royal forests,” so that they could be managed to conserve various 
types of game.44  The “forest” was a land use classification rather than 
a vegetation description; it contained the mix of habitats that “forest” 
animals required.45  Forest law protected both particular places, by 
prohibiting habitat-altering activities, and the game species that lived 
there, by prohibiting hunting—in the language of the time, forest law 
protected “the vert and Venison” (the vegetation and the game):46 
[B]y the Lawes of the Forest, no man may cut downe his woods, 
nor destroy any coverts, within the forest, without the . . . license of 
 
 40. Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law , 15 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 273-74 (1996). 
 41. Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Rele-
vance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 855 (1982).  
 42. Id.; Bosselman, supra  note 40, at 276. 
 43. Butler, supra  note 41, at 853. 
 44. JOHN MANWOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAWES OF THE FOREST ch. IV, at §§ 1-2 (Wil-
liam S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1598). 
 45. John Manwood defined the forest as “a certaine Territorie of woody grounds and fruit-
full pastures, privileged for wild beasts and fowles . . . to rest and abide in, in the safe protection 
of the king, for his princely delight and pleasure, which Territorie of ground . . . is [legally de-
fined] . . . for the preservation and continuance of which said place . . . there are certaine pa r-
ticular Lawes, Privileges and Officers.”  Id. at ch. I, § 1; see also E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND 
HUNTERS 28-32 (1975); G. J. TURNER, 18 SELECT PLEASE OF THE FOREST ix  (G. J. Turner ed. 
& trans., Selden Society Publishers) (1901).  
 46. MANWOOD, supra  note 44, at ch. I, § 1.  The “vert ”—“every plant, that doth grow 
within the Forest and beare greene leafe”—was protective to preserve the “Venison”—a term 
that at the time meant flesh of any of the animals of the chase.  In Manwood’s flowery phrasing, 
“therefore you shall understand, that even as the old Foresters & good Woodmen, doe  . . . by 
this generall word Venison, unde rstand every beast of Forest and Chase, as a word of art proper 
to beasts of Forest, and beasts of Chase, and to none other.”  Id. at ch. VI, § 1; ch. V, § 1. 
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the Lord chief Justice in Eyre of the Forest, although that the soile, 
wherein those woods do grow, bee a mans owne freehold.47 
Similarly, 
Hawking and Hunting in forests are pastimes of delights and pleas-
ure, ordayned and appointed chiefly for the recreation of Kings and 
Princes, and therefore they are not be used in Forests by everie 
common person, but onely by such, as are Earles, Barons, and No-
ble men of the Realme, being thereunto licensed or authorised by 
the King.48 
Forest law thus was a pervasive body of law that conserved limited 
game species. 
Legal restrictions were not, however, limited solely to places 
suitable as wildlife habitats.  The English government imposed a wide 
variety of hunting and habitat altering restrictions to conserve wild-
life.  In 1285, for example, Parliament enacted the Statute of West-
minster II which set closed seasons on the taking of salmon.49  A stat-
ute enacted in 1393 strengthened these restrictions and also restricted 
habitat alteration by mandating that all dams include weirs “of rea-
sonable wideness” to permit the fish to reach upstream spawning ar-
eas.50  Similarly, a 1692 statute for “better preserving the red and 
black game of grouse” prohibited the burning of “grig, ling, heath, 
furze, goss, or fern” from February through June.51  Lawmakers also 
 
 47. Id. at ch. VIII, § 2; see also Thomas A. Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the American 
Revolution: Lessons from the Past, 74 MICH. L. REV. 49, 60-62 (1975) (arguing that the forest 
laws were intended at least in part to create “wildlife rights”). 
 48. MANWOOD, supra  note 44, at ch. XVIII, § 1. 
 49. Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw., c. 47 (Eng.).  The statute is not unique.  See, 
e.g., The Penalty for Unlawfully Hunting the Hare, 1523, 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.); To Avoid 
Destroying of Wild-Fowl, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 11, § 2 (Eng.); An Act . . . for the Preservation of 
the Game in Pheasants and Partridges, and against the Destroying of Hares with Hare -Pipes 
and Tracing Hares in the Snow, 1604, 2 Jam. 1, c. 27, § 6 (Eng.). 
 50. Justices of the Peace Shall be Conservators of the Statutes Made Touching Sa lmons, 
1393, 17 Rich. 2, c. 9 (Eng.). 
 51. An Act for the More Easy Discovery and Conviction of Such as Shall Destroy the 
Game of this Kingdom, 1692, 4 Wm. & M., c. 23, § 9 (Eng.).  When the statute prohibiting the 
burning of heath proved insufficient to deter illegal habitat destruction, Parliament prohibited 
unlicensed persons from selling fern ashes.  An Act for the Better Prese rvation of the Game, 
1706, 6 Ann., c. 16, § 10 (Eng.).  See also An Act for the Preventing the Burning or Destroying 
of Goss, Furze or Ferne, in Forests or Chaces, 1755, 28 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 3 (Eng.). 
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relied upon bag limits,52 gear restrictions,53 and prohibitions on com-
merce to conserve and to allocate wildlife.54 
Although the commons system lasted for centuries, abuses of the 
system by the wealthier landlords were frequent.  The unfortunate 
poor tenant was denied his remedy at law for the illegal abuses of the 
more powerful landowners.  This ultimately led to the enclosure of 
most of the common land by the mid-nineteenth century.55 
“After centuries of lapse, the doctrine that certain lands always 
belong to the sovereign was revived in England during the early sev-
enteenth century to augment the declining fortunes of the Crown.”56  
In many of the debates over the extent of royal power, the public 
trust was raised as an issue.57 
C. The American Experience 
When colonists arrived in America, they brought the doctrine 
from England, “although they changed its beneficiary from the mon-
archy to the public as a whole.”58  As with many of the common law 
doctrines taken from England and modified to fit New World needs, 
the public trust doctrine was unclear and its application varied: 
 
 52. See, e.g ., An Act for Preservation of Spawn and Fry to Fish, 1558, 1 Eliz., c. 17, § 2 
(Eng.). 
 53. See, e.g ., No Man Shall Fasten Nets to Any Thing over Rivers, 1423, 2 Hen. 6, c. 15 
(Eng.); An Act for the Preservation of Fishing in the River Severn, 1678, 30 Car. 2, c. 9 (Eng.). 
 54. The English also addressed their natural environment in other ways.  In 1306, King 
Edward decreed “all but smith to eschew the obnoxious material [i.e ., coal] and return to the 
fuel of old.”  See ALLAN KANNER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT TRIALS 1-2, n.3 (2d. ed. 
2001) (citation omitted). 
 55. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1391 (1993).  The enclosure 
movement: 
in England took place in waves during the period 1450-1849.  The earliest enclosures 
were carried out unilaterally by manorial lords; the later ones, by act of Parliament.  In 
essence, an enclosure erased some or all of the preexisting rights in common lands in a 
specific village, laid out new roadways, and repartitioned the affected territory into 
private parcels that were larger and more compact than open-field strips, but smaller 
than the open fields themselves. 
Id. 
 56. Sarah C. Smith, A Public Trust Argument for Public Access to Private Conservation 
Land, 52 DUKE L.J. 629, 639 (2002). 
 57. Carol M. Rose, Takings, Public Trust, Unhappy Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review 
of Professor Joseph Sax’s Defense of the Environment Through Academic Scholarship: Joseph 
Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351 (1998) (alluding to the role of 
the public trust in debates on the royal prerogative). 
 58. Smith, supra note 56, at 639 (citing to Lazarus, supra note 31, at 636) (stating that the 
nineteenth century jurists specifically included jus publicum, the rights of the general public, in 
their division of water rights). 
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Indeed, the scope of the public trust doctrine is subject to consider-
able debate.  Many scholars acknowledge the public trust doctrine 
but maintain that the reach of the doctrine should be fixed.  They 
argue that sudden shifts in the doctrine’s application cannot inhere 
in a title because abrupt changes in the doctrine cannot be consis-
tent with settled rules of state law.  Critics of an evolving public 
trust doctrine are correct that sudden shifts in a doctrine argue 
against its characterization as a background principle.  But it is in-
consistent to recognize the public trust doctrine as a background 
principle on one hand and then limit its application to a “traditional 
scope” on the other.  Controlled evolution is inherent in the very 
definition of the public trust doctrine; the fundamental purpose of 
the doctrine is to meet the public’s changing circumstances and 
needs.  Just as what constitutes nuisance has changed over time, so 
too has the public trust doctrine slowly been “molded and ex-
tended” to satisfy the needs “of the public it was created to bene-
fit.”  Careful, predictable expansions of the doctrine, therefore, are 
not novel legislative decrees, but constitute a firmly embedded ex-
ercise of state duty.59 
Beginning with Massachusetts Bay in 1694, the colonies adopted 
restrictions on killing or capturing wildlife.60  By the American Revo-
lution, every colony except Georgia had established limitations on 
killing deer.61  As the population increased, so did legislative output; 
gear restrictions, bag limits, and licensing requirements soon fol-
lowed.62 
Legislatures also routinely restricted land use to conserve wildlife 
habitats.63  The most common examples were statutes requiring mill 
owners to install fishways in their milldams.64  For example, when Es-
sex Company was incorporated by the Massachusetts legislature in 
 
 59. Zachary C. Kleinsasser, The Law and Planning of Public Open Space: Boston’s Big Dig 
and Beyond, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 433-34 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 60. Shannon Peterson, Bison to Blue Whales: Protecting Endangered Species Before the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 22 ENVIRONS L. & POL’Y J. 71, 73 (1999). 
 61. See Thomas A. Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 720 n.139 
(1976). 
 62. See Dean Lue ck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 625, 633 (1995). 
 63. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Ta kings 
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1294-95 (1996). 
 64. See, e.g., Curtis v. Hurlburt, 2 Conn. 309 (1817); Eastman v. Curtis, 1 Conn. 323 (1815); 
Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 (1835); Vinton v. Walsh, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 87 (1829); Stoughton v. 
Baker, 4 Mass. 522 (1808); Sickles v.  Sharp, 13 Johns. 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); State v. Glen, 52 
N.C. 321 (1859); Fagan v. Armistead, 33 N.C. (1 Ired.) 433 (1850); Hart v. Hill, 1 Whart. 124 (Pa. 
1835); Boatwright v. Bookman, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 447 (S.C.L. 1839). 
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1845, it was required to provide fish passage facilities in the dam it 
sought to construct on the Merrimack River.65 
After the American Revolution, the rights of the sovereign 
passed to the governments of the individual colonies, not the central 
federal government.66  Originally emphasizing water-related re-
sources,67 the public trust doctrine has expanded to include nearly all 
natural resources.68 
Traditionally, the states managed fish and wildlife as heirs of the 
king’s common law powers by conveyance through the colonial gov-
ernments.69  This idea, known as the state ownership doctrine, can be 
traced to that amalgam of common and international law that in-
formed the early legal developments in this country. 
In Arnold v. Mundy,70 the court found that the State of New Jer-
sey held the land beneath navigable waters in trust for its citizens be-
cause the king had done the same.71  Relying upon Blackstone’s 
Commentaries72 and Vattel’s The Law of Nations,73 the court con-
 
 65. THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED 174-75 (1991); see also Peter M. 
Molloy, Nineteenth Century Hydropower: Design and Construction of Lawrence Dam, 1845-
1848, 15 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 315 (1980). 
 66. In Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842), the Supreme Court held that the English 
public trust doctrine ha d survived the American Revolution: “[W]hen the people of New Jersey 
took possession of the reins of government, and took into their own hands the powers of sover-
eignty the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged either to the crown or the parlia-
ment, became immediately and rightfully vested in the state.” 
 67. See Lazarus, supra note 31, at 636-40. 
 68. Sharon M. Kelly, Note, The Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judicial Over-
view of Resource Management Decisions in Virginia, 75 VA. L. REV. 895, 897 (1989) (“In recent 
years, these uses have been expanded to include hunting, swimming, recreational boating, aes-
thetics, climate, scientific study, environmental and ecological quality, open space, wildlife habi-
tat preservation, and water allocation.”). 
 69. Robin Kindus Craig, Comment, Of Fish, Federal Dams, and State Protections: A State’s 
Options Against the Federal Government for Dam-Related Fish Kills on the Columbia River, 26 
ENVTL. L. 355, 360 (1996) (“Under the wildlife laws of the United States, management of fish 
and wildlife is the states’—not the federal government’s—prerogative.  As early as 1895, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the power to regulate wild animals passed from England 
through the colonial governments to the states. ”). 
 70. 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).  New Jersey was the first state in the country to consider the ap-
plicability of the public trust doctrine and has applied the doctrine expa nsively.  “[The state’s 
natural] resources are vital for the economic, recreational, and aesthetic benefits central to the 
health and well being of the citizens of this State.”  New Jersey Council on Environmental Qua l-
ity, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1DD-1 (2003).  “[T]he discharge of petroleum products and other haz-
ardous substances within or outside the jurisdiction of this State constitutes a threat to the 
economy and env ironment of this State.”  New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11a (2003). 
 71. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 42. 
 72. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *261. 
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cluded that this meant that the oysters growing on those lands were 
also owned by the state in trust.74  In a subsequent decision, the fed-
eral circuit, again relying upon Blackstone and Vattel, held that state 
ownership-in-trust meant that oysters were not items of commerce 
and hence, a New Jersey statute prohibiting nonresidents from har-
vesting oysters did not violate either the Commerce Clause or the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.75 
Meanwhile, the law regarding conflicts over land use was evolv-
ing.  Such conflicts were at first easy to resolve.  Usually, the common 
law remedy of nuisance was sufficient to settle private disputes.76  Ini-
tially, the strength of the concept of property rights, and the Lockean 
notion that if a person had paid for something, it was his to do with as 
he wished, overrode any suspicion that the public might be better 
served if certain activities were prohibited or restricted.77  However, 
as American cities grew, public controls became necessary.  Cities 
used their police power to enact ordinances restricting certain activi-
ties, such as tanneries,78 candle makers,79 or slaughterhouses with 
their attendant odors and refuse,80 to particular parts of town.  Com-
mon law remedies to redress land use abuses continued to evolve.81 
 
 73. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 120 (1758). 
 74. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 62. 
 75. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Ca. 546, 550-53 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).  See Martin v. Waddell, 41 
U.S. 367 (1842), Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 
73 (1855), McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), and Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 
240 (1890) (tracing subsequent developments). 
 76. See, e.g., Woodring v. Forks Twp., 28 Pa. 355, 361 (1857). 
 77. Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New 
Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 361 (1990) (“The laissez faire philoso-
phies of Locke, Smith, and Bentham contributed to this perception of the absolute and indi-
vidualistic nature of private property.  Property bespoke individual rights which tolerated only 
minimal interference by the state.”). 
 78. See Gardenshire v. State, 221 P. 228, 229 (Ariz. 1923). 
 79. See St. Louis v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 296 S.W. 993, 994 (Mo. 1927). 
 80. See Gardenshire, 221 P. at 229. 
 81. Most controls of land use come from government regulation, but some arise at common 
law.  One is the concept of nuisance.  Another is the notion of waste, which can arise when pe o-
ple share interests and rights in a resource.  Waste is committing acts upon the land that are 
harmful to the rights of the party not in possession.  A tenant who cuts down all the trees in a 
landlord’s yard, for example, would be guilty of waste.  Waste can be affirmative (cutting down 
the trees) or permissive (allowing a roof to deteriorate so that rain damages the interior of the 
house).  The remedy for waste can be money damages, an injunction to stop the conduct that is 
causing the harm, or some combination of the two.  See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water 
Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 439, 445 (1986). 
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The public trust doctrine was static throughout the nineteenth 
century.  The shorelines and land underlying navigable rivers contin-
ued to be held in the public trust.82  This limited the action of a pri-
vate property owner on these lands to those not interfering with the 
public trust.83  The nineteenth century public trust was one of nega-
tive rights, preventing harm but imposing no affirmative duties on the 
landowner or state. 
Just before the turn of the century, Illinois Century Railroad Co. 
v. Illinois84 changed the nature of the public trust by establishing af-
firmative duties of the states with respect to the public trust.  In 1869, 
the State of Illinois granted some submerged Chicago shorefront 
lands in Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad Company.85  
Four years later, regretting its gift, the state repealed the grant.86  The 
state then filed suit to quiet the title so that the chain of ownership 
would be clearly recorded.87  Understandably, the railroad company 
objected.  The state retaking title to land that was privately owned 
seemed to raise the constitutional question of a violation of due proc-
ess.88  However, the United States Supreme Court cleverly avoided 
the constitutional question by finding the original grant of land to be 
invalid because it violated public trust obligations in Illinois.89  This 
case established the central tenet in public trust litigation: that prop-
erty held in trust for public use must not be constrained.90 
The Supreme Court held that submerged lands under Lake 
Michigan were owned by the State of Illinois and held in trust for the 
people of the state for their common use and enjoyment and could 
not be transferred.91  The Supreme Court stated that the land was: 
 
 82. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the 
Source and Scope , 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 454-55 (1989). 
 83. See COYLE, supra  note 31, at 224-25 (arguing that the public trust doctrine has been 
applied beyond its original commercial intentions to include preservation and environmental 
motives). 
 84. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
 85. Id. at 448. 
 86. Id. at 449. 
 87. Id. at 439. 
 88. Id. at 418. 
 89. Id. at 464-65. 
 90. See Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachu-
setts Colonial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV. 623, 645 (1998). 
 91. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.  The Court held that because the state holds sub-
merged lands in trust for the people, it cannot convey those lands without some clear benefit to 
the trust: 
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[d]ifferent in character from that which the state holds in lands in-
tended for sale . . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from 
the obstruction or interference of private parties.92 
In effect, the Supreme Court held that the state could not revoke 
the grant of submerged land because the company never really had 
title to them in fee simple; its title was always limited by the public 
trust.93  In other cases in which states have conveyed trust lands to 
private owners, the courts reasoned that the public trust property in-
terests consist of two bundles of rights, the jus privatum (private 
right) and the jus publicum (public right).94  These cases concluded 
that the state could transfer the private right only in strict subordina-
tion to the public trust easement created by the public right.95  Over-
all, the effect of Illinois Central has been profound.  The case has 
been relied upon hundreds of times by state courts applying the pub-
 
The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by 
the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be 
relinquished by a transfer of the property.  The control of the state for the purposes of 
the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests 
of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining . . . . A grant of all the lands under the 
navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; 
and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as 
subject to revocation.  The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which 
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave 
them entirely under the use and control of private parties,  except in the instance of pa r-
cels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, 
then it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the pres-
ervation of the peace.  In the administration of government the use of such powers may 
for a limited period be delegated to a municipality or other body, but there always re-
mains with the state the right to revoke those powers and exercise them in a more di-
rect manner, and one more conformable to its wishes.  So with trusts connected with 
public property, or property of a special character, like lands under navigable waters; 
they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the state. 
Id. at 452-54 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 452. 
 93. Id. at 455-56. 
 94. City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 50 P. 277, 285 (Cal. 1897); People  ex inf. 
Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 86 (Cal. 1913). 
 95. See Oakland Water-Front Co., 50 P. at 286; Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87.  
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lic trust doctrine to public resources, including wildlife.96  Some states 
have adopted the doctrine legislatively or constitutionally.97 
Until Professor Joseph L. Sax published his groundbreaking arti-
cle on the public trust, the concept of Illinois Central lay dormant, 
confined to waterways.98  Professor Sax argued that the principle of 
public trust extends far beyond the traditional realms of waterways 
and parklands.  He claimed that “[p]ublic trust problems are found 
whenever government regulation comes into question, and they occur 
in a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests need 
protection against tightly  organized groups with clear and immediate 
goals.”99  Therefore, the government has an additional affirmative 
duty to protect the public resources that are part of the public trust.100  
Since the article was written, United States judges have broadened 
the geographic protections and widened the range of activities under 
the public trust.101 
In Geer v. Connecticut,102 the United States Supreme Court ap-
plied the public trust doctrine to the taking of wildlife.  The issue in 
Geer was whether the State of Connecticut, consistent with the Com-
merce Clause, could forbid interstate transportation of game within 
its borders.103  In affirming that power, the Supreme Court observed 
that, at common law, wildlife, having no owner, is considered to be-
 
 96. E. Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. 
LAW 713, 714 (1996); see, e.g., Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 
184, 211-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying public trust doctrine to fish); Wade v. Kramer, 459 
N.E. 2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying public trust doctrine to wildlife). 
 97. See G. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine Wildlife, 19 
ENVTL. L. 723, 730-31 (1989); see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3; LA. CONST. art. IX §§ 1, 7; 
N.C.  GEN. STAT. § 113-133.1 (2000). 
 98. See Rose, supra  note 57, at 352 (arguing that Professor Sax “ushered in the  . . . most 
recent major revival of the public trust concept” by “unhook[ing] it from its traditional moor-
ings on or around water bodies and appl[ying] it to dry land” (citing Joseph L. Sax,  The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 
(1970))). 
 99. Sax, supra  note 98, at 556. 
 100. Id. at 556-57. 
 101. In the 1980s, it appeared that the public trust expansion was ending, and that contra c-
tion was in sight.  See Lazarus, supra note 31, at 713-14 (arguing that recent Supreme Court 
cases, including Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), presaged the beginning of the 
end for the “environmental” public trust doctrine).  The Supreme Court, however,  seems to 
have avoided a repudiation of an environmental interpretation of the public trust doctrine.  See 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 475 (1988) (holding that states have the right to 
determine the extent of their public trusts). 
 102. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma , 441 U.S. 322 
(1979). 
 103. Id. at 522. 
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long in common to all citizens of a state.104  This principle of govern-
mental control of wildlife was carried over into American society 
upon colonization.105  The Geer Court further reasoned:  
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common prop-
erty in game rests have undergone no change, the development of 
free institutions had led to the recognition of the fact that the 
power or control lodged in the State, resulting from this common 
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, 
as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for 
the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for 
the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public 
good.106 
This state power was, the Supreme Court reasoned, an equitable 
property held “in trust for all the people of the State.”107  Proponents 
of “states’ rights” seized upon the opinion’s broad language and its 
conflation of state regulatory power with concepts of property, claim-
ing that states owned the wildlife within their borders.108  Under the 
then prevalent constitutional theory, state and federal governments 
occupied mutually exclusive spheres.  If states owned the wildlife 
within their borders, the federal government had only a very limited 
role in the conservation of that wildlife.109 
The Geer holding remained law for nearly a century, until the 
Supreme Court reconsidered Geer’s constitutional interpretation in 
Hughes v. Oklahoma.110  While overruling Geer as to the constitu-
tionality of state prohibitions against interstate shipping, Hughes pre-
 
 104. Id. at 527-28.  The Supreme Court stated, with regard to the chain of title at the close of 
the nineteenth century: 
[The] attribute of government to control the taking of animals ferae naturae, which 
was recognized and enforced by the common law of England, was vested in the colo-
nial governments . . . . It is also certain that the power which the colonies thus pos-
sessed passed to the states with the separation from the mother country, and remains 
in them at the present day, in so far as its exercise may not be incompatible with, or re-
strained by, the rights conveyed to the federal government by the constitution. 
Id. 
 105. Id. at 528-30. 
 106. Id. at 529. 
 107. Id. at 534 (quoting Magner v. The People, 97 Ill. 320, 333 (1881)). 
 108. Proponents of the state ownership doctrine ignored the Supreme Court ’s careful quali-
fication that the state power extended only “so far as its exercise may not be incompatible with, 
or restrained by, the rights [sic] conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.”  Id. 
at 528. 
 109. See generally  MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 12-17 (3d ed. 1983).  
 110. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).  
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served the trust responsibility set forth in Geer.111  With respect to the 
continued viability of the state ownership theory, the Hughes court 
stated that “[t]he whole ownership theory, in fact is . . . but a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a 
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an im-
portant resource.”112  After Hughes, the trust responsibility that ac-
companied state ownership remained.113 
The doctrine was later extended beyond navigable waterways by 
statute114 and by the courts115 to cover other public lands.  This cre-
ated more affirmative environmental duties relative to other natural 
resources.  Several courts have taken the small step of using the doc-
trine to protect fish and waterfowl in trust waters.  In one case, an oil 
spill killed a number of birds on the Potomac River.116  When the fed-
eral government and State of Virginia sued the polluter, the defen-
dant moved for summary judgment on the basis that neither govern-
ment owned the birds in question.117  However, the court found that 
the public trust doctrine nevertheless gave them a duty to protect the 
public’s interest in the nation’s wildlife resources.118  Other courts 
have gone further and protected inland wild animals, nonsubmerged 
public land, and subsurface waters.119  Over the last twenty years, 
courts have held that the public has an easement that protects other 
 
 111. Id. at 338. 
 112. Id. at 334 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)). 
 113. See, e.g., Clajon Produce Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Wyo. 1994) (con-
cluding that, after Hughes, the state’s role in governing and conserving wildlife remains un-
changed); State v. Fertterer, 841 P.2d 467, 470 (Mont. 1992) (holding that state holds wildlife “in 
its sovereign capacity for the use and benefit of the people generally ”), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Gatts, 928 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1996); O’Brien v. Wyoming, 711 P.2d 1144, 1148 
(Wyo. 1986) (stating that “by W.S. 23-1-103, all wildlife in Wyoming is declared to be the prop-
erty of the state”). 
 114. “[I]t is the policy of this State to restore, enhance and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of its waters, to protect public health, to safeguard fish and aquatic life 
and scenic and ecological values, and to enhance the domestic, municipal, recreational, indus-
trial and other uses of water.” Water Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-2 (2003). 
 115. See Lazarus, supra note 31, at 649. 
 116. In re Steurt Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 40. 
 119. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 720-21 
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1986) (court applied doctrine to non-navigable waters); 
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E. 2d 114, 121 (Mass. 1966) (court held that ru-
ral park lands were part of the public trust); see also Cynthia Carlson, Making CERCLA Natu-
ral Resource Damage Regulations Work: The Use of The Public Trust Doctrine and Other State 
Remedies, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,299, 10,302 (1988). 
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interests in trust resources, including wildlife habitat, water conserva-
tion, and public access.120 
The scope of protected natural resources today is generally 
broad.  Particular resources, such as rivers, the sea, and the seashore 
are especially important to the community’s well being and are re-
tained for public use.121  Many bodies of water are thus deemed quasi-
public property, giving the sovereign special prerogatives at the ex-
pense of private parties.122  Under the public trust doctrine, the public 
retains an easement to use trust resources for certain public pur-
poses.123   
D. State Responsibility Today Under the Public Trust Doctrine 
1. Duties of the State 
The state’s role as sovereign over trust lands imposes certain en-
vironmental duties that it owes to the public and are thus enforceable 
by the public.124  Under the public trust doctrine, the state “may not 
destroy or relinquish its control over public resources except under 
 
 120. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); United Plainsman Ass’n v. N.D. State 
Water Conservation Comm’n., 247 N.W. 2d 457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976); Borough of Neptune City 
v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972); Carlson, supra note 119, at 
10,302. 
 121. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 718; see also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine 
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471,  475  (1970); 
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
269, 315 (1980).  
 122. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892) (certain lands are held by the 
state in trust for the people, and legislative actions are void or voidable if the court finds they 
violate the trust); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988) (public trust 
extends to all tidal waters, not just navigable waters). 
 123. See Whitney, 491 P.2d at 381; see also Carlson, supra note 119, at 10,302 (1988); H. 
Kenison, et al., State Actions for Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement of the Public Trust, 17 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,434 (1987); F. Halter & J. Thomas, Recovery of Da mages 
by States for Fish and Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5 (1982).  
 124. “The State has not only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure 
that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are protected, and to seek compe n-
sation for any diminution in that trust corpus.”  State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power 
& Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), aff’d., 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).  “The state has an af-
firmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water re-
sources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 
728.  This duty includes the power of the state to reconsider any diversions that were previously 
authorized in accordance with public trust values.  Id. 
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certain, very narrow circumstances.”125  Although states have broad 
discretion implementing fiduciary obligations imposed by the public 
trust, states are not free to alienate or extinguish the trust.126 
The public trust imposes upon the government an “affirmative 
obligation” to protect resources.127  At the most basic level, “the pub-
lic trust doctrine holds that government must act as a fiduciary in its 
management of the resources which constitute the corpus of the 
trust.”128  Public trust resources: 
are protected by the trust against unfair dealing and dissipation, 
which is classical trust language suggesting the necessity for proce-
dural correctness and substantive care. . . . The public trust doctrine 
demands fair procedures, decisions that are justified, and results 
that are consistent with protection and perpetuation of the re-
source.129 
At least one state court has found that the public trust in natural 
resources is an active trust.  This means that the government is re-
quired to affirmatively protect and preserve the trusts.  In 1927, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that: 
The trust reposed in the state is not a passive trust; it is governmen-
tal, active, and administrative. . . . [T]he trust, being both active and 
administrative, requires the lawmaking body to act in all cases 
where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust, but to 
promote it. . . . A failure so to act, in our opinion, would have 
amounted to gross negligence and a misconception of its proper du-
ties and obligations in the premises.130 
Under the public trust doctrine, the state as trustee of natural re-
sources arguably is endowed with duties akin to an ordinary trus-
tee.131  “In theory, a private trust protects a corpus intended for the 
benefit of an individual or group from . . . shortsighted and biased 
 
 125. D. Musiker et al., The Public Trust Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Un-
certain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87, 89 (1995);  accord Sax, supra note 120, at 489-
91. 
 126. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-54; see also, M. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public 
Trust Doctrine: The Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 493 (1997). 
 127. Seth Macinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial Fisheries Ma nagement and 
the Public Trust Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 951 (1993) (citing 
M. Mantell, Frontier Issues, in MANAGING NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM RESOURCES: A 
HANDBOOK ON LEGAL DUTIES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND TOOLS 235, 244 (M. Mantell ed., 1990)). 
 128. Id. at 952 (citing G. Cook, The Public Trust Doctrine in Alaska , in RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES LAW IN ALASKA 29 (1992)). 
 129. RODGERS, supra note 4, at 171-72. 
 130. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927).  
 131. See Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) 
(holding that state has duties applicable to any other trustee). 
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control of one or more beneficiaries.”132  Under traditional trust prin-
ciples, the heart of a trust is the discretionary duties imposed upon 
the trustee; delegation of these discretionary duties to the beneficiar-
ies would defeat the purposes of the trust and render it a nullity.133  
According to the Restatement, the “duty of the trustee is not only to 
take and keep control of the trust assets, but to take and keep exclu-
sive control.”134  “The trustee . . . has exclusive control of the trust 
property, subject only to limitations imposed by law or the trust in-
strument.”135 
The state cannot abdicate its duty to preserve and protect the 
public’s interests in wildlife resources.  This duty is vested exclusively 
in the state.  The state must consider diffuse and competing common 
needs when making decisions relating to the protection of wildlife, 
such as the decision to allow or prohibit hunting and trapping. 
In his widely cited 1970 law review article, Professor Joseph Sax 
developed the modern theory of the public trust doctrine as a tool to 
protect the public interest from the “insufficiencies of the democratic 
process.”136  Sax states that: 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of 
the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism 
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallo-
cate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses 
to the self-interest or private parties.137 
Based on this premise, it follows, inter alia: 
The state, as trustee, must prevent substantial impairment of the 
wildlife resource so as to preserve it for the beneficiaries—current 
and future generations.  Under the public trust doctrine, the state 
must: (1) consider the potential adverse impacts of any proposed 
activity over which it has administrative authority; (2) allow only 
activities that do not substantially impair the state’s wildlife re-
sources; (3) continually monitor the impacts of an approved activity 
on the wildlife to ensure preservation of the corpus of the trust; and 
 
 132. Memorandum from Steven Shareff, Senior Attorney, National Legal Research Group, 
Inc., to Stephen S. Joiner (Feb. 4, 1998), http://www.nlrg.com/samples/shareff.pdf. 
 133. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 51 (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
171 (1959). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS supra note 133, at § 175 cmt. f. 
 135. Cont’l Bank & Trust Co. v. County Club Mobile Estates, 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 
1981). 
 136. Sax, supra  note 121, at 521. 
 137. Id. at 490. 
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(4) bring suit under the parens patriae doctrine to enjoin harmful 
activities and/or to recover for damages to wildlife.138 
2. Different State Approaches to the Public Trust 
States can generally define the extent of the public trust doctrine 
as it is applied in their state.  For example, California v. United 
States139 held that a state has the right to define the nature and extent 
of its property under the common law relating to water interests.140  
As a result of this freedom to define the extent of the doctrine, states 
understandably vary in their approaches to the public trust doctrine.  
Some have an expansive view while other states have a restrictive 
view. 
a. The Expansive View 
New Jersey is one example of a state that has taken an expansive 
view of the public trust.  Hudson City Water Co. v. McCarter forbade 
a private diversion of water from a stream by a company contracted 
to sell water to New York City without the consent of the State of 
New Jersey.  The Supreme Court, in Hudson, stated: 
We are of the opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the 
state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired 
by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent 
of present use or speculation as to future needs . . . and there are 
benefits from a great river that might escape a lawyer’s view.  But 
the state is not required to submit even to an aesthetic analysis.  
Any analysis may be inadequate.  It finds itself in possession of 
what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may 
keep and give no one a reason for its will.141 
Instead of simply cataloging the things and activities that are pro-
tected by the public trust, New Jersey has conceptualized the trust dif-
ferently.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey views the public trust as 
 
 138. Musiker, supra note 125, at 96 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Su-
per. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 709 (Cal. 1983),  cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1986). 
 139. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).  
 140. However, once water, such as the groundwater, is properly reduced to private owner-
ship, it may become a commodity and may be protected under the dormant interstate commerce 
clause.  Any subsequent regulation by the state (as distinct from the assertion of state property 
power or power over the public domain) is subject to the antidiscrimination principles of the 
dormant commerce clause.  See generally  Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce 
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 141. 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908) (holding that its vast underground waters which feed its 
streams and inland lakes are “a great public good . . . [that] . . . it may keep and give no one a 
reason for its will”). 
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a flexible concept, changing with the needs of the population.142  In 
Borough of Neptune City  v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, the court 
held that the public trust doctrine forbids municipalities from dis-
criminating between residents and nonresidents when charging user 
fees for the beach—access must be provided equally to all.143  Using 
this kind of reasoning, a court is free to go beyond fishing and naviga-
tion activities to find a broader recreational interest in the public 
trust.  Traditionally protecting the wet sand of a beach, the public 
trust doctrine has been extended to dry sand.144 
California has taken a similar approach.  The California  Supreme 
Court has extended the public trust inland from the shore in a series 
of cases.  From its original definition in terms of commerce, navig a-
tion, and fishing,145 the court broadened the doctrine.  First, two cases 
established the primacy of the public trust in tidelands, even in cir-
cumstances where those lands were legally sold to private owners un-
der state authorization.146  Second, the next expansion of the public 
trust doctrine in California occurred in a pair of cases in which the 
California Supreme Court held that the shores of both Clear Lake 
and Lake Tahoe were part of the public trust.147  Consequently, by ex-
tension, all inland lakes were included in the public trust.148 
 
 142. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 
1972) (noting that “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and 
needs of the public it was created to benefit”). 
 143. Id. at 55. 
 144. See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1972) (holding that dry beach 
is part of the New Jersey public trust, even when the beach has been substantially improved by a 
private owner). 
 145. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (defining these terms to include “the rights to 
fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and use for boating or general recreation purposes the navigable waters 
of the state”). 
 146. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982) (de-
scribing how the owner traced title to a Mexican grant that was affirmed by federal patent proc-
esses); City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 363 (Cal. 1980) (stating 
that the private company had purchased the land from the state in a sale that was authorized for 
the benefit of the public trust); COYLE, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing the importance of 
Berkeley and Venice Peninsula  in setting new public trust precedent). 
 147. California v. Super. Ct. of Lake County, 625 P.2d 239, 252 (Cal. 1981) (holding that an 
owner of land along the shorelines of navigable nontidal waters in this case, Clear Lake, had 
title to land between the high and low water marks, but that the title was subject to the public 
trust); California v. Super. Ct. of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256, 260 (Cal. 1981) (holding that 
boundaries between public and private lands should be determined with reference to the lake ’s 
current condition, in this case, Lake Tahoe). 
 148. COYLE, supra note 31, at 133. 
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The most recent extension of the public trust came at the gov-
ernment’s expense.  In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,149 
the court was faced with Los Angeles County’s intake of vast 
amounts of water from Mono Lake, dangerously depleting it.150  The 
court held that all tributaries are part of the public trust on the 
ground that, because the public trust already protects navigable wa-
terways, it makes sense to protect the waterways from upstream deg-
radation as well.151  If tributaries are part of the public trust because 
of their impact on navigable waterways, there is no scientific barrier 
preventing a declaration that the entire watershed is part of the public 
trust.152  The tributaries themselves are formed by water flowing over 
the land into small streams.153  Eventually the California public trust 
doctrine has the potential to break free from its water-based origins 
to apply to all natural resources, as foreseen by Professor Sax.154 
Many states, including those that have recently examined the is-
sue, have significantly broadened the trust to include a wide range of 
activ ities.155  In some states, the trust has been extended to include 
wildlife156 and parklands.157  Several states have found that the public 
trust includes a right to recreation.158  For example, the public trust in 
 
 149. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 709 (Cal. 1983) cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1986). 
 150. Id. at 711. 
 151. Id. at 720-21. 
 152. John Alton Duff & Kristen Michele Fletcher, Augmenting the Public Trust: The Secre-
tary of State’s Efforts to Create a Public Trust Ecosystem Regime in Mississippi, 67 MISS. L.J. 645, 
677-78 (1998). 
 153. See M. J. SELBY, HILLSCOPE MATERIALS AND PROCESSES 214-18 (2d ed. 1993) (ex-
plaining how rainfall runs across and through the ground to reach streams and rivers). 
 154. See Sax, supra note 121, at 545. 
 155. See, e.g., Larman v. State , 552 N.W. 2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996) (stating that the public 
trust doctrine encompasses recreational uses); State v. Longshore, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Wash. 
2000) (decla ring that the public trust in Washington includes “incidental rights” such as boating 
and swimming as well as the right to navig ation). 
 156. Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E. 2d 1025, 1027-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing that wild-
life is part of the Illinois public trust, but reasoning that the legislature has the authority to de-
termine when public need for transportation overrides the public interest in wildlife, and refus-
ing to stop the construction of a bridge that would cause some environmental damage). 
 157. Lazarus, supra note 31, at 649. 
 158. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 58-60 (Cal. 1970) (holding that the California 
public trust recreational interest is superior to the private property interest).  But see Burch v. 
Gombos, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 119, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that enactment of Civil Code 
Section 1009 and amendments to Civil Code Section 813 were in reaction to Gion and “largely 
abrogated its holding ”).  See also Gerwitz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S. 2d 495, 511-12 
(N.Y. 1972) (holding that the New York public trust recreational interest is superior to a mu-
nicipal interest). 
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Wisconsin includes the right to sail, swim, hunt, and enjoy scenic 
beauty.159  In a more recent case, Washington courts affirmed expan-
sive access rights in the Washington public trust, but acknowledged 
that the court must balance the benefits of allowing access with pro-
tection of the environment.160  In that case, the court held that the 
public trust rights of access do not include the right to use jet—skis 
that are harmful to water and wildlife.161 
Some states have even adopted legislation or constitutional 
amendments declaring that all publicly held natural resources are 
subject to the public trust.162  These few codifications of the public 
trust notwithstanding, it primarily remains a common law doctrine 
applicable to all land, not just land owned by the state, and will likely 
continue to develop on a case-by-case basis in each state. 
b. The Restrictive View 
Some states have chosen to limit their public trusts to basic uses 
such as navigation and fishing.  For example, Massachusetts took a 
restrictive interpretation of the right to walk along beaches.163  Faced 
with the question of whether the public trust access right to walk 
along beaches included the right to recreate at the beach, the justices 
concluded that the right of access was a right of passage only and did 
not extend to recreational activities while on the public trust land.164  
Maryland has similarly rejected a chance to extend the public trust to 
rights of public access.165  States are split between limited access, such 
as that allowed in Maryland and Massachusetts, and a more broad 
right of access. 
3. What Counts as Public Trust Property? 
Public natural resource law is in a state of constant evolution.  
The reason for this evolution is a growing understanding of the nature 
 
 159. Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W. 2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966). 
 160. See Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-85 (Wash. 1998) (upholding a San 
Juan County ordinance which denied public access to certain recreational boating vehicles that 
were harmful to the environment).  
 161. Id. 
 162. See Horner,  supra note 30, at 58-72 (describing the varying approaches that Louisiana, 
Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Alaska, and Florida have taken in codifying the public trust).  
 163. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E. 2d 561, 566 
(Mass. 1974) (holding that the Massachusetts public trust doctrine does not include the right to 
walk on the beach for bathing). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975) 
(rejecting an extension of Maryland’s public trust doctrine to include recreational interests). 
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and importance of different types of natural resources.  One new re-
source of critical importance that is coming under the domain of the 
public trust doctrine is groundwater. 
a. The Constant Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine  
As discussed in section III.D.2(a), infra, courts continue to ex-
pand the number of resources held under the public trust.  The trust 
rights in a particular resource tend to increase over time.  For exam-
ple, the early trust rights in navigable waters were navigation, com-
merce, and freedom from impeding navigation.166  These trust rights 
in navigable waters evolved over time “to recreational uses, including 
bathing, swimming, and other shore activities.”167  Other state courts 
have further expanded the trust rights in navigable waters to preserve 
tidelands for scientific study, open space, as a marine habitat, and for 
aesthetic beauty.168  As summarized by one commentator: 
In its early form, the public trust doctrine applied to submerged 
lands, the foreshore and navigable waters and protected the pub-
lic’s rights and interests in navigation, fishing, and commerce.  Since 
the 1970s, states and courts have extended the scope of the doctrine 
to protect other public uses including hunting, boating, swimming, 
bathing, and other recreational activities.  Under the influence of 
changing public perceptions, states have applied the public trust 
doctrine to preserve and protect tidelands and other environments 
that provide food, shelter and habitat for birds and marine life and 
that enhance the scenery and climate of certain areas.  The geo-
graphical reach of the doctrine has also been expanded.  The public 
trust doctrine now also encompasses non-navigable waters and 
streams as well as parks, land, wetlands and wildlife.  Thus, com-
pared to its original scope, the public trust doctrine has been ex-
panded considerably.169 
The public trust theory is constantly evolving to address new envi-
ronmental threats and incorporate advances in science.170 
 
 166. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
 167. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
 168. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1970). 
 169. EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Kluwer Law Int’l 51 (The Hague: 2001) (citations omitted). 
 170. See, e.g., Patrick Ryan, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natu-
ral Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.  REV. 
285 (2004) (revealing that the public trust doctrine acts as a check and balance against govern-
ment miscalculations, allowing states to modify its scope when necessary).  See also infra note 
176. 
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b. Groundwater 
The public trust doctrine should encompass a state’s groundwa-
ter.  A defendant polluter may argue that the public trust doctrine 
does not apply to groundwater because it is not historically a part of 
the public trust.  However, the reasons for a lack of historical founda-
tion are that (1) groundwater is only starting to become a policy con-
cern, and (2) recent advances in science lending greater understand-
ing of the hydrological cycle have emerged.  These developments, 
coupled with the flexible nature of the public trust doctrine, lend cre-
dence to the notion that groundwater should be included in the public 
trust doctrine. 
i. Argument Against Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The argument against extending the public trust to groundwater 
is based on the contention that the public trust doctrine traditionally 
applies only to surface water: Groundwater is not navigable and thus 
does not fall within the trust.171  Courts have recognized this distinc-
tion and have been reluctant to expand the doctrine to encompass ac-
tions affecting groundwater.172 
It is true, the historic foundation of the doctrine concerned navi-
gable waterways, especially in the areas of navigation, fishing, and 
commerce.173  Navigation, fishing and commerce were crucial to the 
development of early settlements.  Thus, early courts applied the pub-
lic trust doctrine only to navigable waterways.174  However, given the 
elasticity of the doctrine, the new state interest in groundwater, and 
advances in groundwater science, it is clear that the public trust 
should now to encompass groundwater.  For example, groundwater 
systems provide a valuable recharge function for public drinking wa-
ter.  The availability of the same is, in turn, an important component 
of economic development. 
ii. Flexibility of the Public Trust Doctrine  
The public trust doctrine is an inherently flexible doctrine due to 
the constant evolution of the state interests protected by the doctrine.  
Stated plainly, what society overlooks today might be treasure tomor-
 
 171. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993). 
 172. See id. (holding that the public trust doctrine should not be extended to the groundwa-
ter at issue in the case). 
 173. See Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 240 (1980). 
 174. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
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row.  While this undoubtedly hurts the effort to concretely define the 
public trust, it also creates room for the doctrine to expand to reflect 
society’s new interests.  While courts traditionally focus on com-
merce, navigation, and fishing, they have implied that the doctrine is 
not limited to these three uses.175 
Consider how the importance of tidelands themselves has been 
expanded under the public trust.  Beyond commerce, fishing, and 
navigation, courts are recognizing a new value of tidelands.  Accord-
ing to the Marks court: 
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexi-
ble to encompass changing public needs.  In administering the trust 
the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring 
one mode of utilization over another.  There is a growing public 
recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tide-
lands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preser-
vation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environ-
ments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and 
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.  It is not 
necessary to here define precisely all the public uses which encum-
ber tidelands.176 
Thus, the public trust doctrine was expanded to include tidelands 
to reflect the new concerns of society: environmentalism and preser-
vation.  The reason that the public trust doctrine has not expanded 
yet to deal with the looming groundwater crisis is explained by one 
scholar: 
Lawyers, being scientifically illiterate for the most part, have to our 
knowledge never even asked courts to treat stratospheric ozone 
and the global climate as natural resources . . . . [T]he public trust 
doctrine has not yet achieved wide application even in the field of 
traditional natural resources, such as water rights.177 
iii. The New Interest in Groundwater 
One half of America’s population use groundwater as their pri-
mary source of drinking water.178  Those who live in areas with lim-
 
 175. Erik Swenson, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
363, 363-64 (1999). 
 176. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1970) (citations omitted).  
 177. Bruce Ledewitz & Robert Taylor, Law and the Coming Environmental Cata strophe, 21 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 599, 619-20 n.96 (1997) (citations omitted).  
 178. Purdue Univ. Dep’t of Agricultural and Biological Engineering, The Importance of 
Groundwater, available at http://pasture.ecn.purdue.edu/~agenhtml/agen521/epadir/ grndwtr/ 
importance.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2005). 
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ited precipitation rely heavily on groundwater.179  Only three percent 
of the world’s freshwater is located in reservoirs, lakes, and streams 
while the remaining ninety-seven percent is groundwater.180  In addi-
tion, groundwater can be used for irrigation purposes and to produce 
geothermal energy.181 
The public interest in groundwater is relatively new.  In 1950, the 
United Nations created the World Meteorological Association 
(“WMO”) to monitor (among other focuses) the world’s supply of 
drinking water.  Recently, the agency has been focusing on what it be-
lieves is a major threat to future populations: the pollution of 
groundwater resources.  The WMO reports that: 
Deep groundwater is relatively free from pollutants in many places 
and is excellent for drinking, domestic use and industrial purposes.  
But once an aquifer is contaminated, remedial measures can be 
long and costly, even impossible.  The slow penetration of pollut-
ants has been called a “chemical time bomb.”  It threatens human-
kind.182 
As the public trust doctrine expands to encompass new re-
sources, the courts should recognize the growing importance of 
groundwater.  The state’s assertion of trust authority over groundwa-
ter will deter the resource’s would-be polluters from contributing to a 
“chemical time bomb.” 
iv. Advances in Groundwater Science 
Advances in groundwater science have led to a richer under-
standing of the interaction between groundwater and surface water, 
an area that has been traditionally covered by the public trust.  His-
torically, the law has treated groundwater and surface water as dis-
tinct from one another.183  Science, however, has established a firm 
interrelationship between groundwater and surface water.184  The hy-
drologic cycle refers to the constant movement of water from the at-
mosphere to the earth’s surface via evaporation, precipitation, and 
other processes.185  In some places, the aquifers surrounding streams 
are at a higher elevation than the stream itself and produce ground-
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. World Meteorological Ass’n, Groundwater: The Invisible Resource, available at 
http://www.wmo.ch/web-en/Wdwfea.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).  
 183. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4.11 (1997). 
 184. C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5, 45-48 (2d ed. 1988). 
 185. See id. at 4-6 (discussing the main aspects of the hydrologic cycle).  
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water discharge into the stream.186  Thus, groundwater pollution in-
evitably results in surface water pollution. 
v. Summary 
The public trust is an inherently flexible doctrine.  It has much 
room to evolve and react to new social interests or a greater under-
standing of the world.  Both have occurred with groundwater: The 
impending water crisis has propelled its importance in recent decades 
and scientific advances have shown the impact that groundwater re-
sources may have on surface water. 
E. Codification of the Public Trust Under State Constitutions 
The public trust doctrine is being codified in many state constitu-
tions.187  In some cases, even absent a constitutional provision, state 
courts have read the public trust into existing constitutional provi-
sions.188  Thus, the public trust doctrine, enjoying codification, is no 
longer just an ancient common law doctrine.  The trend toward the 
constitutionalization of the public trust doctrine frees it from the 
stigma (and restraints therein) of being a theoretical common law 
doctrine. 
1. The Trend Toward Constitutionalization 
Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is an exam-
ple of the modern codification of the ancient common law public trust 
doctrine.  It states in part: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and the preserva-
tion of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the envi-
ronment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common 
property of all the people, including generations yet to come.  As 
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.189 
The Pennsylvania legislature adopted section 27 on April 14, 1970—
the world’s first International Earth Day.190 
Other states have followed Pennsylvania’s lead.  For example, 
the Florida Constitution refers to land held “in trust for all the peo-
 
 186. Id. at 5, 45-48. 
 187. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4. 
 188. See, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158 (La. 
1984). 
 189. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 190. Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust 
Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 478 (2001). 
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ple.”191  Hawaii’s constitution marks land held “as a public trust for 
native Hawaiians and the general public.”192  Other state constitu-
tional provisions maintain that at least parts of the state’s navigable 
waters are public.193 
State constitutions have also expanded the public trust beyond 
navigable waters.  According to one commentator: 
In the earliest of these provisions, New York constitutionally cre-
ated the Adirondack forest preserve in 1895.  Within the last dec-
ade, environmental advocates have borrowed and expanded on this 
idea to constitutionally create the “Alabama Forever Wild Land 
Trust,” the “Great Outdoors Colorado Program,” and the North 
Carolina “State Nature and Historic Preserve.”  Amendments to 
several other state constitutions also have dedicated funds or oth-
erwise authorized the state to acquire and preserve land of particu-
lar aesthetic, recreational, or historic value.194 
Sometimes, judges read the public trust doctrine into a state’s 
constitution absent a new constitutional provision.  For example, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state’s environmental regula-
tory framework, in addition to statutes, is also based on the state’s 
constitution and the public trust doctrine.195  The court read the pub-
lic trust doctrine in Louisiana ’s constitution, which says that, “[t]he 
natural resources of the state . . . shall be protected . . . . The legisla-
ture shall enact laws to implement this policy.”196  Some courts have 
found that the public trust doctrine restrains state action by maintain-
ing that the doctrine is constitutional in character.197 
These constitutional law decisions will likely continue because 
these provisions give activists and public interest groups standing 
which they do not generally have in public trust cases.198  Over time, 
this precedent can be expected to expand. 
 
 191. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. 
 192. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4. 
 193. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 24; MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. 14, §§ 1 & 
4; WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 194. Barton H. Thompson, Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role 
of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 871 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 195. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158 (La. 1984). 
 196. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 197. See, e.g., Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1913) (holding that tidelands are 
held in public trust by the state, and that the California state constitution commits the execution 
of the public trust to the legislature). 
 198. See Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 623 P.2d 431, 441 (Haw. 1981) (relying on 
public trust clause of the Hawaiian Constitution to grant standing to an environmental activist 
group). 
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2. The Effect of Constitutionalization 
One important effect of constitutionalization is that it gives cre-
dence to the notion that the public trust doctrine is constantly evolv-
ing.  This makes it even harder to argue that the resource in question 
is not part of the public trust simply because it has not been histori-
cally covered by the doctrine. 
The nature of a constitution is to expand to account for social 
changes—to respond to new problems in society.  As Chief Justice 
Marshall observed, “[i]n considering this question, then, we must 
never forget, that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”199  Marshall 
further observed, “[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”200  
Woodrow Wilson wrote, “the Constitution . . . is not a mere lawyers’ 
document: it is a vehicle for life, and its spirit is always the spirit of 
the age.”201  Justice Blackmun summarized the modern adherence to 
this notion, writing that, “[t]hese precepts of breadth and flexibility 
and ever-present modernity are basic to our constitutional law.”202  
Today, again, we are expounding a Constitution.  The same principles 
that governed McCulloch’s case in 1819 govern modern cases.  There 
can be no other answer.203  By attaching the public trust doctrine to 
state constitutions with “breadth and flexibility,” the public trust doc-
trine is greatly expanded. 
F. Elements for State Recovery of Damages Under the Public Trust 
Doctrine 
In recent years, states have used the public trust doctrine to re-
cover damages for injury to a broad range of public resources.204  To 
recover damages, the government must demonstrate that the public 
trust has been violated by an unreasonable interference.205  This is de-
rived from the classic test of Illinois Central, which finds that the pub-
 
 199. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). 
 200. Id. at 421. 
 201. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1911). 
 202. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 203. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 204. See Meyers, supra note 97, at 731 (regarding the subsequent judicial expansion of the 
doctrine to include fish and wildlife); Lazarus, supra note 31, at 658-60. 
 205. See RODGERS, supra note 4; Carlson, supra  note 119, at 10,302. 
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lic trust has been violated when there has been a substantial impair-
ment of public use.206 
1. Trust Rights 
The threshold factors to be considered in a state public trust case 
are whether the resource is public, and to which public use it is com-
mitted.207  Another factor to consider is the right of the trust in pro-
tecting and perpetuating the resource.208 
2. Unreasonable Interference with Use and Enjoyment 
After establishing a trust right in a public resource, the state must 
show that there has been unreasonable interference with the use and 
enjoyment of the trust right to recover.209  This can be construed as an 
unreasonable “obstruction or hindrance”210 with the use of or “exer-
cise of a right”211 held in trust. 
3. Standard of Liability 
There is no set or real standard of liability in public trust doctrine 
cases.212  This is because claims based on the doctrine are usually re-
solved by balancing competing interests. 
4. Standing to Recover Damages 
The court in Maryland Department of Natural Resources v. Ame-
rada Hess Corp. allowed the State of Maryland to sue Amerada Hess 
for the recovery of damages arising out of an oil spill in Baltimore 
Harbor.213  The defendant moved to dismiss the state’s claim on the 
grounds that the state did not have a property interest in the waters of 
the state and therefore could not sue for damages to the harbor.214  
The defendant acknowledged that the state was the trustee of the wa-
ter, but asserted that a “mere trustee” lacked the proprietary interest 
in the resource necessary to sustain an action for damage at common 
 
 206. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892). 
 207. See RODGERS, supra note 4, at 172 (“The recurring questions call for an identification 
of the resources impressed with the trust and the public uses encumbering them.”). 
 208. See id. (explaining that the public trust demands fair procedures, decisions that are jus-
tified, and results that are consistent with protecting and perpetuating the resource). 
 209. See RODGERS, supra note 202. 
 210. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 818 (7th ed. 1999) (interference). 
 211. Id. at 550 (enjoyment). 
 212. See RODGERS, supra note 4, at 175. 
 213. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972). 
 214. Id. at 1062. 
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law.215  The court rejected the defendant’s argument, reasoning that 
“if the State is deemed to be the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee, 
the State must be empowered to bring suit to protect the corpus of 
the trust i.e., the waters for the beneficiaries of the trust i.e., the pub-
lic.”216 
In State v. City of Bowling Green, the Ohio Supreme Court up-
held the State of Ohio’s right, as trustee, to recover damages for a 
fish-kill allegedly resulting from the negligent operation of a munici-
pal sewage treatment plant.217  The court reasoned that every state 
holds a “property” interest in wildlife on behalf of its citizens and 
concluded that the state had an obligation to protect the trust prop-
erty and to “recoup the public’s loss occasioned by the negligent acts 
of those who damage such property.”218 
Some state courts adopt a more narrow reading regarding a trus-
tee’s right to recover damages, allowing only recovery of damages to 
resources that the government actually owns.  For example, in State v. 
Dickinson Cheese Co., the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the 
state’s claim for damages to fish killed by a release of whey into the 
Heart River.219  The court concluded that the State of North Dakota 
did not have a sufficient property interest in the fish in their wild state 
to support a civil action for damages.220  A Pennsylvania court simi-
larly concluded that the State of Pennsylvania could not recover dam-
ages for fish killed by a company’s release of chemicals into French 
Creek, because the state did not own the fish.221  Other states imple-
ment the public trust in a more proactive way than just calculating 
damages.222 
 
 215. Id. at 1066. 
 216. Id. at 1067. 
 217. 313 N.E. 2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974).  
 218. Id. 
 219. 200 N.W. 2d 59, 61 (N.D. 1972).  
 220. Id. 
 221. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 232 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). 
 222. “The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning 
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”  Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983),  cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 977 (1986).  This duty includes the power of the state to reconsider any diversions that were 
previously authorized in accordance with public trust values.  Id.; see also Matthews v. Bay 
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).  
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G. Defenses 
1. Not Part of the Historic Public Trust 
A party will not be held liable for damages to natural resources if 
it has a valid defense.  The most obvious defenses to a claim for NRD 
are negative defenses by which a defendant asserts that either the re-
source is not held in the public trust or the right asserted in the re-
source is not a trust right.223  This will probably be an area of substan-
tial litigation in the future.  As courts continue to increase the number 
and types of resources and trust rights encompassed by the public 
trust, defendants will resist the expansion, arguing that it is unreason-
able for courts to expand certain trust rights.  A plaintiff’s response to 
such a defense is that the trend has been to expand the doctrine.224 
2. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants are protected from liability once the statute of limita-
tions has tolled.  However, some states, recognizing the growing im-
portance of their natural resources (particularly groundwater), have 
passed legislation extending the statute of limitations for claims 
brought by the state for compensation for damages to natural re-
sources.  In New Jersey, for example, many NRD claims were set to 
expire if not brought to court by the end of 2001.225  The state legisla-
ture responded by passing a four-year extension of the statute of limi-
tations.226 
Defendants may also attempt to employ the laches defense.  In 
equity, the “doctrine of laches bars relief to those who delay the as-
sertion of their claims for an unreasonable time.”227  A successful la-
ches defense consists of three affirmative elements: “(1) a substantial 
delay by a plaintiff prior to filing suit; (2) a plaintiff’s awareness that 
[the harm was occurring]; and (3) a reliance interest resulting from 
the defendant’s continued development of good-will during this pe-
riod of delay.”228  While defendants might be able to show a substan-
tial delay by the trustees in filing suit, there may be difficulty in show-
 
 223. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that states have no trust right in wildlife). 
 224. See supra Parts III(D)(2)(a) & 3(a). 
 225. Michael R. Rodburg & Richard F. Ricci, Top Ten Reasons Why New Jersey Businesses 
Should Be Concerned About Natural Resource Damages, THE METRO. CORPORATE COUNSEL 
(April 2003), available at http://www.lowenstein.com/new/TMCC0403.pdf. 
 226. Id. 
 227. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 228. Id. 
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ing that the trustee had full awareness that the harm was occurring 
particularly with regard to the extent of the harm.  This is especially 
true in instances of groundwater contamination, where the damage is 
not ascertainable without an extensive study. 
3. Implicit Consent 
Some defendants may argue that public policy supports a defense 
of implicit consent by the state.  Under this argument, damage to 
natural resources is a natural consequence of economic development.  
Thus, by establishing a regulatory scheme which allows for develop-
ment that inevitably damages natural resources, the state, as public 
trustee, is giving its implied consent to those damages. 
This argument may also arise with regard to the issue of mone-
tary damages.  Defendants may argue that the state taxes derived 
from the activity causing NRD should be deducted from the mone-
tary damages awarded to the state.  Otherwise, the suit may result in a 
windfall for the plaintiff state trustee by recovering more from the de-
fendants than the actual damages. 
4. Multiple Sources of Pollution 
When there are multiple sources of pollution, common law prin-
ciples of joint and several liability generally apply.229  The effect of 
common law joint and several liability is “to excuse one defendant 
from paying any portion of the judgment if the plaintiff collects the 
full amount from the other.”230  Joint and several liability, however, 
does not apply when there is a state statute that clearly abrogates the 
common law principle.231  While the state technically has no burden of 
allocation, a court may use its equitable discretion to allocate liability 
(the cost of which is indirectly borne by the state).232 
 
 229. Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA? , 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 299, 311 (1995) (Courts have begun “to impose joint and several liability 
more frequently in such cases by finding that the harm created by multiple polluters was indi-
visible.”). 
 230. Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods. Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 374 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Velazquez 
v. Water Taxi, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. 1980)). 
 231. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“[T]o abrogate a common-law 
principle, the statute must ‘speak directly ’ to the question addressed by the common law.”) (ci-
tations omitted). 
 232. CERCLA provides some guidance here.  Despite CERCLA’s common law joint and 
several liability, Congress recommended that “[i]n resolving contribution claims, the court may 
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines 
are appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). 
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The work of proving who is responsible for what in a case with 
multiple defendants can be very costly and time consuming.  For this 
reason, many states may find that the risk of using public funds to 
pursue public trust doctrine cases, in which recovery is not guaran-
teed, is not justified.  However, if the state contracts with an outside 
litigation firm on a contingency basis, the burden of this risk is shifted 
from the state to the private sector.  The advantages of this relation-
ship are discussed later. 
5. CERCLA Defenses Not Applicable 
A defendant otherwise liable for damages under CERCLA will 
not be held liable if he can: 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or 
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages result-
ing therefrom were caused solely by—(1) an act of God; (2) an act 
of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing 
directly or indirectly, with the defendant . . . if the defendant estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due 
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned . . . and (b) 
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any 
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result 
from such acts or omissions . . . .233 
The traditional defenses to damages to natural resources under 
CERCLA, however, are not available to defendants under public 
trust actions.234 
H. Valuation and Remedies 
Once liability has been established and affirmative defenses 
overcome, the factfinder must then turn to the issues of valuation and 
remedies.  Damages for restoration, repair, replacement, and loss of 
use are the most common remedies in public trust NRD cases.235 
 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
 234. See M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS 673-76 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
 235. See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D.N.M. 2004); New Mexico v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2004); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., CIV 99-
1118 BSJ/KBM & CIV 99-1254 BSJ/ACT (consolidated) (D.N.M.).  
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1. Compensatory Damages: Restoration, Repair, and  
Replacement 
The basic principle of compensatory damages is to restore the 
plaintiff to his rightful position. 236  From an economic standpoint, the 
purpose of compensatory damages is to force tortfeasors to take ac-
count of their inflicted harm.237  Value is generally considered the 
measure of the rightful position.238  Value, as applied to damages to a 
state’s natural resources, can be measured as the cost of restoration or 
the cost of replacing the  resource(s). 
The right of a state to recover compensatory damages for the de-
struction of natural damages is well established.239  However, the de-
termination of damages itself is not free from controversy.  Environ-
mental losses are unique—their value cannot often be translated into 
a dollar amount.  According to the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, “[t]here will always be controversy where in-
tangible losses have to be evaluated in monetary terms.”240  This be-
lief is echoed by another NRD expert, who notes that “the most 
daunting task facing trustees . . . is the determination of damages.”241 
The choice between choosing restoration/repair or replacement 
often depends on state law.  In some circumstances, punitive damages 
may be appropriate.242 
a. Market Valuation 
The diminution in value, or full value in the case where the natu-
ral resource is entirely destroyed, is a matter of market valuation.  
Under this approach, the court attempts to place a dollar amount on 
the damage to the natural resource and award the trustee that 
 
 236. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15-16 (3d ed. 2002). 
 237. Id. at 17. 
 238. Id. at 19. 
 239. See Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d at 750, 759 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1975) (New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the state, as public trustee, had a right 
to seek compensatory damages for a fish kill caused by the defendant’s release of toxic pollut-
ants); see also Md. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 
1972); Maine v. M/V Tomano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Me. 1973). 
 240. Report of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Panel on Contingent 
Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4611 (Jan. 15, 1993) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990). 
 241. Richard B. Stewart, et al., Evaluating the Present Natural Resource Damages Regime: 
The Lawyer’s Perspective, in NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
POLICY ANALYSIS 163 (Richard B. Stewart ed., 1995). 
 242. See infra  Part III(H)(2). 
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amount in monetary compensation.243  Industry prefers this approach, 
as market valuation is relatively easy to measure and promotes eco-
nomic efficiency.244 
There is no standard formula for determining the value of a re-
source.  With regard to injury to privately held resources, courts look 
at the diminution in property value to determine damages.245  This, of 
course, is not feasible in many public trust cases where the resource, 
for example, groundwater, may have little effect on the value of the 
property.  There are other common methods of market valuation: 
For injuries to animals, damages have been set historically at the 
animal’s market value.  Common-law decisions addressing damage 
to productive trees customarily use diminution in land value as the 
measure of damages.  Market value was used recently when the 
State of Washington sought recover under parens patriae for dam-
ages to a public salmon fishery.246 
The main criticism of market valuation is that it does not reflect the 
true value of the resource.  Natural resources also have existence and 
intrinsic value not reflected in market valuation.247 
Existence value emphasizes the value society places on the exis-
tence of natural resources apart from any “pragmatic” use which may 
be derived from them.248  Three types of existence value include op-
tion value, vicarious value, and intertemporal value.249  One commen-
tator explains these three forms of existence value: 
Existence value has three distinct subparts.  First, humans may 
place their own ‘option value’ on the preservation of natural re-
sources.  While I have never visited Yosemite National Park, I 
might want to do so someday and, therefore, I value its preserva-
tion.  Retaining the option of future use intuitively has an economic 
importance.  Second, humans may obtain ‘vicarious value’ from 
natural resources.  Even if I never intend to visit Yosemite National 
Park, I may still value its preservation.  The knowledge that a given 
natural environment is protected is valuable to some Americans, 
and vicarious appreciation of nature, therefore, has a demonstrable 
economic value.  Third, preservation of natural resources may have 
‘intertemporal value.’  Even if I have no interest in visiting Yosem-
 
 243. Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 302-03 
(1989). 
 244. Id. at 303 . 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (citations omitted).  
 247. Id. at 309. 
 248. Id. at 285. 
 249. Id. at 285-86. 
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ite National Park, I may want my offspring and their descendants to 
have the chance to see the park.250 
Existence value, which examines the value of a resource’s exis-
tence to mankind, is complemented by the somewhat more contro-
versial intrinsic value, which determines the resource’s value based on 
its nature, independent of the interests of humans.  According to eco-
logical ethicists and philosophers, all living things possess an equal 
right to live and blossom, and modern capitalist methods of evalua-
tion do not account for this value.251  To the extent that market valua-
tion does not account for existence or intrinsic value, it does not accu-
rately reflect the full value of a resource. 
Another problem arises with market valuation: It does not accu-
rately reflect the need for conservation because the appraisal value of 
natural resources is limited to its current value, rather than its future 
value.  In Decatur County AG-Services, Inc. v. Young, a farmer’s crop 
of beans was destroyed by the defendant’s negligent pesticide spray-
ing.252  It was the farme r’s practice to hold the beans for one year be-
fore selling them.253  The price of the beans when first harvested was 
$7 per bushel—the price at the farmer’s intended date of sale was $10 
per bushel.254  The court awarded damages according to the $7 price, 
holding that “damages are computed at the time of harvest, when a 
market value first exists.”255 
The application of this line of thinking to a commodity such as 
groundwater is disturbing.  As was discussed above, a crisis surround-
ing water shortages looms, and is even beginning to take hold in some 
western states.256  Yet, the current price of water is relatively cheap.257  
With the tremendous public policy interest in preserving this precious 
resource for the well-being of future citizenry, should not this interest 
in preservation be reflected by assessing the value of the water by its 
potential future value rather than its current value?  In May 2000, 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Arne Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary , 
16 INQUIRY 95, 96 (1973), available at http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/pessimism/Naess_ 
deepEcology.html. 
 252. 426 N.E. 2d 644 (Ind. 1981). 
 253. Id. at 645. 
 254. Id. at 645, 647 n.3. 
 255. Id. at 647. 
 256. Henry Brean, Western States to Miss Drought Plan Deadline, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL, March 31, 2005, at B4. 
 257. See Steven D. Barnes, Conserve Water Now or Pay Up in the Future, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, May 30, 2005, at F1. 
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Fortune magazine declared that “[w]ater promises to be to the 21st 
century what oil was to the 20th century: the precious commodity that 
determines the wealth of nations.”258 
Defendants, of course, respond to this argument by citing the 
hornbook propositions that, for a damage award to be upheld, it must 
be reasonably foreseeable to the plaintiff.  However, as the Supreme 
Court noted, “[t]he most elementary conceptions of justice and public 
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncer-
tainty which his own wrong has created.”259  Whether the courts apply 
this reasoning to the growing litigation over groundwater spoliation 
will undoubtedly be a matter for controversy in the coming years. 
b. Cost of Repair or Restoration 
In many cases, the natural resources are not just destroyed: They 
are destroyed and toxic substances are left behind.  Such substances 
have the potential of harming human health or other natural re-
sources.  In such cases, damages should not be limited to the diminu-
tion in value approach.  The state should be able to recover the costs 
of full restoration and all consequential damages that result. 
Defendants may contend that, in a situation where a natural re-
source is valued at $1 million, the state should not be able to recover 
$3 million, as this results in a windfall.  But this objection is near-
sighted, as there is actually no windfall.  The public and natural re-
sources are affected or potentially affected by the hazardous waste, 
and thus, the diminution in value approach is no guide to damages. 
At the same time, some courts have been reluctant to award res-
toration where the cost of restoration grossly exceeds the value of the 
resource.  For example, in Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, the 
First Circuit found that a $6 million restoration award in an oil spill 
case was “disproportionately expensive” compared to the resource 
damaged and the award was therefore inappropriate.260  According to 
the court, the focus in determining such a remedy should be on the 
steps a reasonable and prudent sovereign or agency would take to 
mitigate the harm done by the pollution.261 
 
 258. Shawn Tully, Water, Wa ter Everywhere, FORTUNE, May 15, 2000, at 342, 343. 
 259. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). 
 260. 628 F.2d 652, 675-77 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 261. Id. at 675. 
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c. Cost of Replacement 
Given the large costs associated with restoration, some courts 
may calculate damages according to the cost of replacement.  Under 
this scenario, the trustee, at the  defendant’s expense, creates a com-
parable site rather than repairing the damaged one.  This was the ap-
proach adopted by a federal court in United States v. Board of Trus-
tees of Florida Keys Community College.262  In that case, the college 
erected a beachfront structure that destroyed one-half of an acre of a 
fish habitat.  In light of evidence that restoration would be very ex-
pensive, the court ordered the defendant to create a similar habitat on 
its property.263 
Recovery of replacement costs also has its shortcomings.  Re-
placement costs have little value when a polluter destroys a unique 
resource.  Also, it is not feasible when the resources destroyed are fi-
nite resources such as groundwater and subterranean aquifers. 
2. Punitive Damages 
While remote, there is nonetheless a possibility of punitive dam-
ages in some public trust cases.  Situations in which punitive damages 
might be appropriate are those in which the unreasonable interfer-
ence was longstanding,264 where the defendant was marked by indif-
ference,265 or where the injury was the result of an intentional busi-
ness choice.266 
3. Loss of Use During Period of Damage 
“Loss of use” damages refer to damages that compensate the 
public for its loss of use of the resource during the period it was dam-
aged.267  Awarding damages for loss of use is an established aspect of 
American remedies.268  “Loss of use” damages are also utilized in 
cases involving damages to natural resources.269  For example, in cases 
 
 262. 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
 263. Id. at 275. 
 264. See, e.g., Nichols v. Burke Royalty Co., 576 P.2d 317, 322 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). 
 265. Id. 
 266. See, e.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W. 2d 681, 689 (Tex. 1975). 
 267. See generally  Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural 
Resource Dama ge Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005). 
 268. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958) (considering loss of use 
damages for Native Americans whose horses were killed by the United States government). 
 269. See In re Montaux Oil Transp. Corp. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, Ltd., No. 90 CIV 
5702, 1996 WL 340000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996) (holding loss of use damages are recover-
able under the Clean Water Act);  Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 770 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding loss of use da mages are recoverable under CERCLA). 
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involving National Parks, the Park System Resource Protection Act 
defines damages to natural resources as the compensation for both 
restoration and the value for loss of use.270  There are two aspects of 
use value: consumptive and nonconsumptive uses.271 
a. Consumptive Uses 
While use value refers to the worth of resources to those people 
who use them, consumptive use value relates to those people who 
consume the resource.272  For instance, a fisherman deprived of fish-
ing on a contaminated lake for six months loses six months worth of 
consumptive use value.  It is entirely plausible that loss of consump-
tive use during the period of damage, since it accurately portrays the 
full damages suffered by the public as a whole, and by extension the 
trustee, should be included in market valuation and compensatory 
damages. 
b. Nonconsumptive Uses 
Lost nonconsumptive use value during the time of damage re-
lates more to the aesthetic and recreational uses of a resource rather 
than the consumption of the resources.273  An example is lost tourist 
revenue for whitewater rafting operators during a time when reme-
dial projects are undertaken.  The losses incurred from a loss of non-
consumptive use during the period of restoration probably even ex-
ceed the loss of consumptive use.274 
I. Summary 
The underlying theory behind the public trust doctrine is that the 
government holds important resources in trust for its citizens.  Ex-
actly what is held in the public trust varies from state to state.  It can 
be limited, however, as some courts have narrowed the public trust 
doctrine’s application to cases where government actually owns the 
damaged resources.  Applied to NRD claims, the doctrine gives gov-
 
 270. 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 271. Steven Edwards, In Defense of Environmental Economics, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 73, 79 
(1987). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. William W. Shaw, Problems in Wildlife Valuation in Natural Resource Management, in 
VALUATION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCE BENEFITS 221, 225 (G. Peterson & A. Randall eds., 
1984) (citing studies that show that 20 million Americans spent more than 478 million days en-
gaged in consumptive use sport hunting in 1975 compared to the 49 million Americans that 
spent 1.6 billion days participating in wildlife observation). 
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ernments, primarily the states, a cause of action for damages for un-
reasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the public re-
sources that government holds in trust.  The forms of relief available, 
as evidenced by the case law, are injunctive relief, monetary damages, 
or other equitable relief.  There is no defined standard of liability in 
public trust cases. 
IV.  PARENS PATRIAE 
A. Overview 
Parens patriae refers to the government’s role as guardian for 
persons legally unable to act for themselves, such as juveniles and the 
insane.275  Originally, parens patriae was used to protect people under 
a legal disability to act for themselves.276  Subsequently, courts have 
expanded the doctrine to encompass the government’s power to sue 
to redress injury to “quasi-sovereign” interests.277  A “quasi-
sovereign” interest is a direct and independent interest of the state, 
and not merely an attempt by the state to recover for the benefit of 
individuals.278  Actions to vindicate states’ sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests are sometimes referred to as parens patriae ac-
tions,279 though the Latin label is not always used.280  Whatever the 
label, a state may recover costs or damages incurred because of be-
havior that threatens the health, safety, and welfare of the state’s citi-
 
 275. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); Ha-
waii v. Stanford Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). 
 276. Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 
665, 671 n.47 (1959); see Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of La tter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1890). 
 277. Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Dam-
ages, 6 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 412-13 (1970). 
 278. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Oklahoma  ex rel. Johnson v. 
Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1938). 
 279. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 600-01. 
 280. The doctrinal labels used to support states’ actions on behalf of their citizenry vary.  
Sometimes no doctrinal labels are used.  See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 
U.S. 191 (1967) (cause of action for costs of cleanup).  Sometimes the state’s action is framed as 
one brought by the trustee of property for the benefit of the public.  State v. City of Bowling 
Green, 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974) (cause of action for damages describing parens patriae); Al-
fred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 608-09 (cause of action to protect economic interests of a 
class of workers). 
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zenry. 281  Suits may be for damages or equitable relief.282  A line of 
case has allowed parens patriae suits for NRD by states.283 
A state’s interests that may suffer damages can be sovereign, 
quasi-sovereign, or proprietary.  As explained more fully below, the 
state’s sovereign interest is its interest in seeing that its laws are 
obeyed and enforced, and that the health and well-being, both physi-
cal and economic, of its residents is protected.  Behavior that violates 
criminal laws, civil laws, or other regulatory provisions compromises 
the very sovereignty of the state and can be subjective of a civil action 
brought in the state’s name.  But the state does more than merely en-
force its laws—a state’s quasi-sovereign interests include its interest in 
its citizens’ health, safety, and welfare as well as in a healthful envi-
ronment.  A state’s proprietary interests are those that the state as-
serts on its own behalf as might any other legal entity. 
Everyone has an ongoing duty to refrain from impinging upon 
the state’s sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests.  These interests 
are only infrequently the object of civil litigation.  This is most likely 
due to the fact that, fortunately, breaches of duty on a scale warrant-
ing civil state involvement are rare.  Parens patriae actions are not 
necessarily appropriate for isolated acts of misbehavior and harm.  
Because parens patriae interests are infrequently litigated, this section 
presents the background and scope of parens patriae actions and the 
interests they protect.  Understanding the nature and scope of the 
state’s interests in parens patriae cases is critical to understanding the 
full implications of the doctrine in future cases. 
American courts uniformly recognize a state’s authority to sue, 
as parens patriae, to vindicate the state’s and its citizens ’ interests.  
The parens patriae doctrine in the United States generally follows the 
same principles in federal and state courts.  State court cases discuss-
 
 281. See, e.g., LA. CONST. pmbl. (The state exists to “promote the health, safety . . . and wel-
fare of the people.”). 
 282. See, e.g ., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907). 
 283. See, e.g ., Idaho v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc., No. 88-1279, 1991 WL 22479, at *5 (D. 
Idaho Jan. 24, 1991) (allowing state parens patriae negligence action as alternative to CERCLA 
claim for damages to fish); State v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973) (damages for 
harm to coastal waters and marine life caused by oil spill); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, 
States Standing to Sue on Behalf of Citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23, § 6 (1979) (collecting authori-
ties); see also Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States,  30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929) (cost 
of replanting recoverable from negligent starter of fire that destroyed young growth in public 
forest); Spokane Int’l Ry. Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1934). 
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ing parens patriae regularly rely on federal precedents.284  Federal 
doctrine is therefore a natural starting place to describe the parens 
patriae doctrine. 
B. The Parens Patriae Doctrine in Federal Court 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed parens patriae’s 
modern history in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico.285  In 
that case, Puerto Rico sought to bring suit in its capacity as parens pa-
triae against numerous individuals and companies in the  Virginia ap-
ple industry.286  The complaint alleged that the defendant had vio-
lated federal statutes and regulations by “failing to provide 
employment for qualified Puerto Rican migrant farm workers, by 
subjecting those Puerto Rican workers that were employed to work-
ing conditions more burdensome than those established for tempo-
rary foreign workers, and by improperly terminating employment of 
Puerto Rican workers.”287  Puerto Rico alleged that this discrimina-
tion against Puerto Rican farm workers deprived: 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of its right “to effectively par-
ticipate in the benefits of the Federal Employment Service System 
of which it is a part” and thereby caused irreparable injury to the 
Commonwealth’s efforts “to promote opportunities for profitable 
employment for Puerto Rican laborers and to reduce unemploy-
ment in the Commonwealth.” 288 
Puerto Rico’s actions prompted the Supreme Court to review the en-
tire line of parens patriae cases with regard to standing and develop-
ment of quasi-sovereign interests. 
1. Parens Patriae Standing 
To have parens patriae standing, the state must assert an interest 
related to its sovereignty.289  An “easily identified” sovereign interest 
consists of “the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and enti-
ties within the relevant jurisdiction [which] . . . involves the power 
to . . . enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal.”290  Thus, the 
 
 284. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc., 684 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)), writ de-
nied, 690 So. 2d 42 (La. 1997). 
 285. 458 U.S. at 600. 
 286. Id. at 597. 
 287. Id. at 598. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 601. 
 290. Id. 
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state’s power to enforce civil and criminal codes is an interest that 
may be protected through parens patriae actions.291 
Parens patriae standing cannot be based on proprietary interests 
or private interests pursued by the state as a nominal party.  Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.: 
Not all that a State does, however, is based on its sovereign charac-
ter.  Two kinds of nonsovereign interests are to be distinguished.  
First, like other associations and private parties, a State is bound to 
have a variety of proprietary interests.  A State may, for example, 
own land or participate in a business venture.  As a proprietor, it is 
likely to have the same interests as other similarly situated proprie-
tors.  And like other such proprietors it may at times need to pur-
sue those interests in court. Second, a State may, for a variety of 
reasons, attempt to pursue the interests of a private party, and pur-
sue those interests only for the sake of the real party in interest.  In-
terests of private parties are obviously not in themselves sovereign 
interests, and they do not become such simply by virtue of the 
State’s aiding in their achievement.  In such situations, the State is 
no more than a nominal party.292 
2. Development of Quasi-sovereign Interests 
In addition to sovereign interests, the Supreme Court recognizes 
a class of “quasi-sovereign” state interests that can support parens pa-
triae actions.  In this recognition, however, it is less clear what consti-
tutes a “quasi-sovereign” interest than a sovereign interest.  Quasi-
sovereign interests were defined by the Supreme Court in Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. as “not sovereign interests, proprietary interests, or 
private interests pursued by the State as a nominal party.”293 
Quasi-sovereign state interests lie in the “well-being of the popu-
lace.”294  The Supreme Court developed this concept through exam-
ple and counter-example rather than through deductive reasoning.  
“A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an 
actual controversy between the State and the defendant.  The vague-
ness of this concept can only be clarified by turning to individual 
cases.”295 
 
 291. The Supreme Court recognized a second sovereign interest of less relevance here —the 
demand for recognition from other sovereigns, which usually involves the maintenance and re c-
ognition of borders. 
 292. 458 U.S. at 601-02. 
 293. Id. at 602. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
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In Louisiana v. Texas,296 Louisiana unsuccessfully sought to en-
join a quarantine maintained by Texas officials, which placed limita-
tions on trade between Texas and the port of New Orleans.  The Su-
preme Court labeled Louisiana’s interest as that of a quasi-sovereign 
parens patriae interest, and made the distinction between the state’s 
sovereign and proprietary interests: 
Inasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of interstate commerce 
is not committed to the State of Louisiana, and that State is not en-
gaged in such commerce, the cause of action must be regarded, not 
as involving any infringement of the powers of the State of Louisi-
ana, or any special injury to her property, but as asserting that the 
State is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters com-
plained of affect her citizens at large.297 
Although Louisiana was denied relief, a line of cases developed 
in which states were permitted to represent the interests of their citi-
zens in enjoining public nuisances, including the discharge of sew-
age,298 flooding,299 water pollution,300 diversion of water,301 and air 
pollution. 302 
In the first of these cases, Missouri v. Illinois,303 the Court ex-
pressly tied parens patriae standing to protection of the health and 
comfort of a state’s citizens.  “[I]t must surely be conceded that, if the 
health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the 
State is the proper party to represent and defend them.”304  Later, in 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. ,305 a state’s quasi-sovereign interest 
was extended beyond public health to include interests in the land on 
which citizens reside and in the air they breathe.306 
The Supreme Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. stated that 
these early nuisance cases were premised on the threat of injury to 
the public health and comfort.  After surveying many parens patriae 
cases, the Supreme Court summarized the doctrine as follows: 
 
 296. 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
 297. Id. at 19. 
 298. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). 
 299. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923). 
 300. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). 
 301. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); 
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). 
 302. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 303. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).  
 304. Id. at 241. 
 305. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).  
 306. Id. at 237. 
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This summary of the case law involving parens patriae actions leads 
to the following conclusions.  In order to maintain such an action, 
the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of par-
ticular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal 
party.  The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.  Although 
the articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case devel-
opment—neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive 
list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract—certain 
characteristics of such interests are so far evident.  These character-
istics fall into two general categories.  First, a State has a quasi sov-
ereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and eco-
nomic—of its residents in general.307 
While AGs can include public health interests to establish parens 
patriae status, the interests qualifying  as quasi-sovereign interests 
have been further extended. “[P]arens patriae interests extend well 
beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances.”308  In 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,309 Pennsylvania was held to be a proper 
party to represent its residents’ interests in maintaining access to 
natural gas produced in West Virginia: 
The private consumers in each State . . . constitute a substantial 
portion of the State’s population.  Their health, comfort and wel-
fare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the 
gas from the interstate stream.  This is a matter of grave public con-
cern in which the State, as the representative of the public, has an 
interest apart from that of the individuals affected.  It is not merely 
a remote or ethical interest, but one which is immediate and recog-
nized by law.310 
The state’s quasi-sovereign interest in its citizens’ economic well-
being was recognized in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.311  
Georgia alleged that railroads had conspired to fix freight rates in a 
manner that discriminated against Georgia shippers in violation of 
federal antitrust laws.312  The Court equated unlawful trade barriers 
with the pollution and nuisance cases: 
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of 
Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as 
the result of this alleged conspiracy . . . . [Trade barriers] may cause 
 
 307. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico  ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982), writ 
denied, 690 So. 2d 42 (La . 1997). 
 308. Id. at 605. 
 309. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).  
 310. Id. at 592. 
 311. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).  
 312. Id. at 443. 
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a blight no less serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land 
or the deposit of sewage in the streams.313 
Furthermore, the defendants’ alleged wrong: 
limits the opportunities of [the state’s] people, shackles her indus-
tries, retards her development, and relegates her to an inferior eco-
nomic position among her sister States.  These are matters of grave 
public concern in which Georgia has an interest apart from that of 
particular individuals who may be affected.314 
This issue has also arisen in the context of the tobacco litigation.  
Although many states filed actions against the tobacco industry, only 
one tobacco case expressly analyzed a state’s authority, as sovereign, 
to maintain a cause of action for harm to the health, safety, and wel-
fare of its people.315  That case sustained the state’s authority.316  In 
the Texas tobacco case, federal Judge David Folsom posed the ques-
tion “whether the State could maintain this action [against the defen-
dants in] . . . common law in the absence of any statutory provi-
sion.”317  Relying on Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., Judge Folsom 
concluded “that the State could bring such an action.”318 
Judge Folsom first noted that the Supreme Court had approved 
actions by states to protect quasi-sovereign interests and that these 
“interests can related [sic] to either the physical or economic well-
being of the citizenry.”319  He then found that the state had a suffi-
cient interest to maintain an action in its quasi-sovereign capacity. 
First, it is without question that the State is not a nominal party to 
this suit.  The State expends millions of dollars each year in order to 
provide medical care to its citizens under Medicaid.  Furthermore, 
participating in the Medicaid program and having it operate in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner improves the health and welfare 
of the people of Texas.  If the allegations of the complaint are 
found to be true, the economy of the State and the welfare of its 
people have suffered at the hands of the Defendants . . . . It is clear 
to the Court that the State can maintain this action pursuant to its 
quasi-sovereign interests found at common law.320 
Judge Folsom’s ruling has implications for other AG actions.  He 
held that a defendant’s alleged wrongdoing would give rise to a viable 
 
 313. Id. at 450. 
 314. Id. at 451. 
 315. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997). 
 316. Id. at 962. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 962-63 (citations omitted). 
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cause of action absent any statutory authorization.321  The state’s 
quasi-sovereign interests, standing alone, give it the authority to 
prosecute an action. 
3. The Quasi-sovereign Interest in Natural Resources 
Governmental interests in natural resources have been recog-
nized as “quasi-sovereign” since the turn of the century.  In 1907, the 
Supreme Court upheld the State of Georgia’s standing as parens pa-
triae to enjoin a Tennessee mining company’s discharge of air pollu-
tion that was allegedly injuring privately owned forests, crops, and or-
chards in Georgia.322  Concerns about pollution were also tied to 
more general concerns about health.323  The State of Georgia, which 
did not own the injured property, presented its argument for damage 
to the Supreme Court as if it were a dispute between private par-
ties.324  The Supreme Court, observing that the state owned very little 
of the property alleged to be damaged, recast the state’s claim as a 
suit for injury to resources owned by Georgia in its capacity of “quasi-
sovereign.”325  The Supreme Court held that Georgia had established 
that a private company’s industrial pollutants “threaten damage on so 
considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, 
within the plaintiff state as to make out a case.”326  That is, as phrased 
in Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, to maintain a parens patriae 
suit, the state “must show a direct interest of its own and not merely 
seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in 
interest.”327  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that: 
In that capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind 
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.  It 
has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of 
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.328 
Justice Holmes’ reference to the right to “breathe pure air” is 
made in a context that establishes health as an interest that the state 
may clearly defend through parens patriae actions.  If harm to “the 
forests and vegetable life” could be defended through such actions, it 
follows, a fortiori, that health could be protected by parens patriae ac-
 
 321. Id. at 962. 
 322. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
 323. Id. at 238-39. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938). 
 328. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. 
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tions.  Thus, although pollution often causes aesthetic damage and is 
a common trigger for parens patriae actions, the underlying reason for 
recognizing causes of action against polluters is because pollution 
threatens the health and safety of the citizenry. 
More recently, in Maine v. M/V Tamano, a federal district court 
upheld the State of Maine ’s suit as parens patriae to recover damages 
from defendant’s discharge of 100,000 gallons of oil into Casco Bay 
after hitting an outcrop.329  The state sought three categories of dam-
ages: (1) damages to property that it owned, such as state parks and 
submerged lands; (2) third-party damage claims and clean-up costs 
pursuant to a state statute; and, (3) damages as parens patriae for in-
jury to “all of the natural resources lying in, on, over, under and adja-
cent to its coastal waters.”330 
The vessel owner moved to dismiss the state’s claim as to the 
third category of damages, arguing that the State of Maine was really 
seeking to recover for injuries to individual citizens and lacked a suf-
ficiently independent interest in its coastal waters and their marine 
life to permit a parens patriae suit.331  The court rejected this argu-
ment, observing that Maine’s sovereign interest in its coastal waters 
and resources was amply supported by state and federal common 
law.332  The court concluded that Maine had an interest apart from 
the affected individuals, reasoning that an injury to Maine’s coastal 
water and marine life would seriously harm the environment of the 
state and the recreational opportunities and welfare of its citizens.333 
In State Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cen-
tral Power and Light Co.,334 the state of New Jersey brought an action 
against the defendant public utility company engaged in the genera-
tion and distribution of electricity within the state.  The state, as 
parens patriae, sought damages for the death of a large number of 
menhaden fish, allegedly caused by the sudden flow of cold water into 
a stream in connection with the defendant’s operation of a nuclear 
power plant.335  Affirming the lower court’s judgment in favor of the 
 
 329. 357 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Me. 1973). 
 330. Id. at 1098-99. 
 331. Id. at 1099. 
 332. Id. at 1100-01. 
 333. Id. at 1101; see also In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(upholding New York’s claim as parens patriae to recover costs of cleaning oil spilled in the St. 
Lawrence Waterway). 
 334. 308 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975), rev’d on 
other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).  
 335. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 336 A.2d at 752-53, 759. 
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state, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the state did 
not have a proprietary right to the fish in its waters sufficient to sup-
port an action for compensatory damages for the destruction 
thereof.336  The court said that “[t]he state has not only the right but 
also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure that the rights of 
the public to a viable marine environment are protected, and to seek 
compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus.”337  In addition, 
the court said that “absent some special interest in some private citi-
zen, it is questionable whether anyone but the state could be consid-
ered the proper party to sue for recovery of damages to the environ-
ment.”338  The court further stated that, “[b]oth parties agree that the 
State has an interest which gives it standing to sue under parens pa-
triae doctrine for injunctive relief from pollution in navigable waters 
which causes injury to fish.”339  The court held that the State of New 
Jersey had standing to seek both an injunction and damages.340 
The state’s interest in protecting its environment is either part of 
its greater interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizenry 
or a severable interest that the state may protect.  State and federal 
courts recognize states’ authority to sue as parens patriae for many 
threats to public health, safety, and welfare.  These include damage to 
coastal or harbor waters and marine life,341 discharge of sewage into 
public waters,342 the diverting of water from an interstate stream,343 
changes in drainage which increase the flow of water in an interstate 
stream,344 the threat of being forced to accept low level radioactive 
waste,345 refusal of medical clinics to provide sign language interpret-
ers at medical examinations of deaf patients,346 schemes constituting 
 
 336. Id at 758-59. 
 337. Id. at 759. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 758. 
 340. Id. at 758-59. 
 341. Id. at 750; Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Me. 1973); Md. Dep’t of 
Natural Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972). 
 342. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). 
 343. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
 344. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923). 
 345. Nebraska v. Cent. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n, 834 F. Supp. 
1205, 1210-11 (D. Neb. 1993), aff’d, 26 F.3d 77 (8th Cir. 1994).  
 346. People v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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common law fraud,347 and restraints on the commercial flow of natu-
ral gas.348 
C. The Parens Patriae Doctrine in State Court 
The parens patriae principles, developed primarily in federal 
court litigation and approved by the United States Supreme Court, 
have been endorsed by the states.  While many states lack case law di-
rectly addressing parens patriae authority to sue, there are no states in 
which the principle of parens patriae has been deemed not a part of 
the state’s law. 
In Minnesota v. Ri-Mel, Inc.,349 the state alleged wrongdoing by 
health clubs and their owners.  In approving the state’s standing as 
parens patriae, the Minnesota appellate court stated: 
Although there is no express statutory authority for the attorney 
general’s action for restitution on behalf of injured club members, 
common law has recognized that under the doctrine of parens pa-
triae a state may maintain a legal action on behalf of its citizens, 
where state citizens have been harmed and the state maintains a 
quasi-sovereign interest.  It is also established that Minnesota has a 
quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the economic health of its 
citizens.350 
The court further identified a factor supporting parens patriae ac-
tions not emphasized by the Supreme Court in its review of parens 
patriae cases in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.  Citing Minnesota v. 
Standard Oil Company,351 the court took into account the likelihood 
of successful lawsuits by individuals.352  The court viewed parens pa-
triae actions as a way for the state to represent a group of harmed citi-
zens whose individual harms might not lead them to bring an action. 
Minnesota has an added incentive to bring the action as parens pa-
triae to assure its citizens the full benefit of the legislation and . . . 
individuals with small overcharges would likely not avail them-
selves of their individual remedy because of the burden of pursuing 
the action.  Minnesota has a similar incentive to bring an action on 
behalf of club members as parens patriae, because the injured club 
members may not avail themselves of their remedy under the Club 
Contracts Act because of the economic burden of suing on a small 
 
 347. Alaska v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 421 (Alaska 1982) (collecting 
cases). 
 348. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). 
 349. 417 N.W. 2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 350. Id. at 112 (citations omitted). 
 351. 568 F. Supp. 556 (D. Minn. 1983). 
 352. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W. 2d at 112. 
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claim.  The clubs’ closings affected the economic interests of more 
than 16,000 citizens, and Minnesota does have a quasi-sovereign in-
terest in protecting their economic health.353 
In Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. 
of America,354 the State of California alleged that the defendant 
unlawfully disposed of hazardous waste.  The court held that the state 
has a legally cognizable property interest in the waters of the state.355  
The state court expressly relied on “a line of cases [that] recognize 
and protect the State’s parens patriae interest in the air, land, and wa-
ters of its territory.”356 
D. Summary 
In summary, whether brought in state or federal court, the inter-
est sought to be protected in a parens patriae action must differ from 
that of an ordinary individual owner or tort victim.  The facts must 
show that the state has an interest independent of the private inter-
ests of its citizens.  In addition, the cases should involve behavior that 
adversely affects a substantial number of the state’s citizens. 
It is important to clarify that the doctrine of parens patriae is 
generally understood to grant a state standing to sue but does not, in 
and of itself, create a cause of action.357  Where natural resources 
have been injured, states most frequently use public nuisance as the 
underlying cause of action.358  In contrast, the public trust doctrine 
provides its own theory of recovery. 
In addition, the doctrine of parens patriae may provide states 
with standing to sue for damage to a broader range of resources than 
the public trust doctrine, because the former doctrine does not re-
quire the resources to be associated with property that is owned by 
the state.  For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., although 
 
 353. Id. 
 354. 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  
 355. Id. at 605 . 
 356. Id. 
 357. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 259 (1972) (holding that the claim 
cannot be resolved simply by reference to the general principle of parens patriae; injury must be 
compensable under statute).  
 358. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (enjoining copper compa nies 
from discharging noxious gas on nuisance theory); see also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 
(1901) (granting Missouri standing to sue Illinois under nuisance theory for sewage discharges 
into the Mississippi River); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (grant-
ing New York standing to recover oil spill cleanup costs as parens patriae under nuisance the-
ory). 
030806 KANNER.DOC  3/13/2006  4:45 PM 
112 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16:57 
the State of Georgia was able to bring a successful parens patriae case 
to enjoin a copper company from discharging air pollutants that were 
destroying privately owned forests, the action may have failed if it 
had been brought under the public trust doctrine because the lands 
involved were not owned by the state.359 
The underlying theory behind the parens patriae doctrine is that 
the state should be permitted to recover for damages to its “quasi-
sovereign” interests.  The quasi-sovereign interests continually ex-
pand and can be quite broad, varying from state to state.  Applied to 
NRD claims, the parens patriae doctrine provides that governmental 
interests in natural resources are “quasi-sovereign” and distinct from 
interests of any individuals who could be affected.  The doctrine gives 
governments the standing to sue for damages to natural resources.  A 
state relying on this doctrine, however, must pursue an independent 
cause of action. 
V.  PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS 
Undoubtedly, the use of the AG’s office to enforce a state’s envi-
ronmental values has public policy implications.  But one must resist 
the temptation to argue that the AG is stepping on the toes of the leg-
islature in doing so.  In essence, when bringing actions for NRD un-
der the public trust doctrine or as parens patriae, the AG is simply ful-
filling his or her duty to uphold the laws of the state.  The AG, as the 
enforcer of the state’s laws, is the perfect candidate to pursue the 
state’s interests as trustee of the public trust and parens patriae over 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign state interest. 
Actions by the AG should not be considered partisan political 
maneuvers.  The assertion of public trust rights by states is consistent 
with both liberal and conservative ideas of stewardship, sustainability, 
and property (albeit public property) rights in an environmental con-
text. 
Other incentives exist which make this AG-centered approach 
attractive on public policy grounds.  The first is the cost-shifting in-
centive.  Rather than costly bureaucratic regulatory schemes, litiga-
tion by the AG’s office is comparably cheaper, especially if the AG 
contracts with an experienced plaintiffs’ attorney under a contingency 
fee arrangement.  Second, if an AG chooses to hire a plaintiffs’ firm 
to take cases on a contingency fee basis, the firm can pursue the ac-
tions beyond the term of a particular AG.  This “endurance incen-
 
 359. See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 230. 
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tive” decreases a defendant’s motive to delay as long as possible.  The 
third incentive is the “pick and choose” incentive.  AGs can pick 
which cases and industries to target, and side-step those that involve 
particularly sensitive political issues which may be better handled at 
the legislative level.  In this sense, an AG can immediately take on 
those cases which pose less controversy and, without delay, begin to 
collect damages for injury to natural resources and to clean-up the 
environment. 
A. The Cost-shifting Incentive 
The AG approach provides benefits to the citizenry of the state 
with little cost to them.  This is especially true when the litigation is 
assigned to an experienced plaintiffs’ attorney on a contingency fee 
basis.  The cost of the litigation falls upon the parties doing the litigat-
ing, thus requiring very little public money.  In a time when many 
states are struggling to raise revenue for even the most basic social 
services,360 the cost-shifting aspect of the AG approach should appeal 
to a broad base of policy makers. 
Governmental litigation is favored the most in nations that have 
the tightest budgetary constraints, like the United States and states 
therein.361  Faced with tough budget decisions, state environmental 
programs are suffering deep budget cuts.362  Also, given the massive 
federal budget deficit, federal cuts are likely to shift much of the bur-
den of environmental enforcement to the states.363  According to one 
source, “total money for state assistance grants for environmental 
services has been cut by eight percent, or $300 million.364  About nine-
teen percent was cut from the Clean Water State Revolving Fund, a 
major program which provides financial assistance to states to ensure 
safe water.”365  Therefore, it stands that things are only going to get 
worse for the policy makers regarding their financial ability to pro-
vide the level of environmental protection and cleanup demanded by 
their constituents.  Using the AG to pursue public trust and parens 
 
 360. Elizabeth C. McNichol, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Using Income Taxes to Ad-
dress State Budget Shortfalls (2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/2 -11-03sfp.pdf. 
 361. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 179 (1st ed. 2002). 
 362. See, e.g., Jenny Hunsperger, State Budget Crisis Hinders Dam Safety , HATTIESBURG 
AMERICAN, Dec. 29, 2004. 
 363. See Laura Kujawski, Federal Budget Situation Worsens, State to Carry Burden, PNN 
Online News Network, Jan. 4, 2005, available at http://pnnonline.org/article.php?sid=5668. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
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patriae actions is a solution to this seemingly insurmountable problem 
looming on the horizon.  By contracting with a plaintiffs’ attorney, 
states can pursue polluters at little or no cost to the state. 
B. The Endurance Incentive 
Environmental assessments, lawsuits, and the collection of dam-
ages can take years.  Often one single lawsuit may outlast the term of 
a particular AG in the state.  A new AG’s administration may bring 
with it new priorities and wish to allocate the resources of the AG’s 
office in different ways.  Thus, it is conceivable that many lawsuits will 
be “dropped” when a new AG takes over.  By contracting with a 
plaintiffs’ attorney, this is less likely to happen.  The AG approach 
makes it possible for the state to pursue NRD with greater endur-
ance. 
The importance of this endurance is not to be understated.  The 
credible threat of endurance provided by the AG approach gives in-
dustry the incentive to settle the case, rather than delay until an elec-
tion cycle produces results favorable to them.  When faced with an 
opponent with the resources to “go the distance,” as many plaintiffs’ 
firms have, industry will likely want to settle its claims with the state. 
C. The Pick and Choose Incentive 
Undoubtedly, some environmental issues are more controversial 
than others, generating passion on both sides of the issue.  Logging in 
the Pacific Northwest is a good example, where the issue is often 
framed in terms of “the environment versus jobs.”366  Given the con-
troversy surrounding these issues, an argument can be made that they 
are better left up to the legislature.  Under the AG approach, the AG 
can avoid such cases, and “pick and choose” cases which enjoy a 
broad political appeal, avoiding a political fight while helping to clean 
up the environment and gain revenue for cash—strapped states. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
An environmental crisis is looming, especially with regard to ac-
cess to water for drinking and irrigation.  States, many of whom are 
suffering serious budget cuts, need to find a way to address this prob-
lem absent the emergence of a costly new regulatory scheme.  The 
public trust doctrine and parens patriae provide state AGs with an ef-
 
 366. See Philip Dawdy, Election 2004: On the Tree Stump, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Oct. 24, 2004 
at 18. 
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fective means to deter would-be polluters and collect for damages to 
natural resources.  As commodities, such as drinking water, become 
strained, courts should expand the public trust doctrine to include 
more natural resources.  Alternatively, a state has standing under 
parens patriae to sue for damages to any natural resources in which a 
“quasi-sovereign” interest can be shown.  By contracting with private 
attorneys on a contingency fee basis, the state can regulate and pro-
tect its resources while shifting the cost of doing so onto other parties. 
